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I.  INTRODUCTION 
A thoughtful student once asked an immigration judge during an 
informal exchange:  “If the respondent1 in your court who has just been 
found deportable2 appears to qualify for cancellation of removal3 but has 
failed to fill out the form properly,4 what would you do?”  The judge 
responded matter-of-factly, “I am not his attorney.  If the application is 
 
 1. The “respondent” in an immigration deportation proceeding is the “non-citizen” who is 
brought by the government before an immigration judge to answer charges of deportability.  Here, 
the terms ‘non-citizen,’ ‘immigrant,’ and ‘respondent’ are used interchangeably.  For a description 
of the procedure and the use of terminology, see notes 3-5 infra. 
 2. The Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) of 1996, 
Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 to -724 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 
U.S.C.), consolidated two separate proceedings, previously called “exclusion” and “deportation” 
proceedings, into one, called a “removal” proceeding.  See id. § 306.  IIRIRA has made some 
changes to terminology; it has maintained the term deportation, deportable, and deportability.  This 
article uses the term deportation as signifying the process of removal of ‘noncitizens’ from the 
United States.  The term “deportation” is chosen, not only because it is technically accurate but also 
because it captures the severity of the measure more appropriately.  The term removal is also used 
where appropriate.  The principal body of United States immigration law, the Immigration and 
Nationality Act (INA) of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 8 U.S.C.), uses the term “alien” to signify the noncitizen status of a person.  See id. § 
101(a)(3).  Although this author has used the term ‘alien’ in his previous writings for the sake of 
accuracy, because of increasing concerns about the pejorative nature of this term and in order to 
minimize the possibility of confusion for purposes of this article, the term “alien” is replaced with 
the term “noncitizen” throughout this article.  Incidentally, it is interesting to note that among other 
countries, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have also replaced it with the term 
noncitizen.  See Won Kidane, The Terrorism Bar to Asylum in Australia, Canada, The United 
Kingdom, and the United States:  Transporting Best Practices, 33  FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 300, 300 
n.3 (2010). 
 3. Cancellation of removal is one of many forms of affirmative relief that is available for 
noncitizens who have been found deportable.  The requirements for cancellation of removal are set 
forth under INA sections 240A (a)-(b).  The grounds of deportability are set forth under INA section 
237(a).  The process is elaborated in subsequent sections.  
 4. There are two forms that could be used to apply for cancellation of removal.  Both are 
made available by the Department of Justice, Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR).  
One of the forms is the EOIR-42A:  Application for Cancellation of Removal for Certain Permanent 
Residents, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42a.pdf.  The second one is called 
the EOIR-42B:  Application for Cancellation of Removal and Adjustment of Status for Certain 
Nonpermanent Residents, available at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/eoirforms/eoir42b.pdf.  These 
forms contain detailed instructions on how the applicant must complete the form.  The forms are 
difficult to understand for any person who has not studied immigration law.  This point is further 
elaborated by example below. 
2
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not completed properly, I don’t have an application to consider.”5  It 
goes without saying that the judge would then order the respondent 
deported for not submitting a properly completed application for relief.  
The judge’s response might have seemed harsh or even insensitive to the 
student, but wasn’t that the right answer under the existing adversarial 
system?  If so, what could be done to avoid such kinds of harsh 
consequences?  This article considers these basic questions through a 
comparative lens.6      
 
 5. This incident happened a few years ago in the presence of the author.  The exchange and 
the discussions thereafter provided the impetus for this article.  The identities of the parties to this 
exchange are withheld. 
 6. Several notable functions are attributed to comparative law research.  Understanding one’s 
own system better and looking for inspirations from other systems to improve it are considered to be 
perhaps the most important functions.  See RENÉ DAVID & JOHN E.C. BRIERLEY, MAJOR LEGAL 
SYSTEMS IN THE WORLD TODAY 4, 6-7 (3d ed. 1985).  The objectives of this comparative study are 
primarily seeking inspiration from the civil law inquisitorial legal tradition.  The greatest diversity 
in law seems to be found in the epistemology of determining facts, not substantive notions of right 
and wrong.  Consider the following anecdote.  The former President of the World Court, Queen’s 
Counsel (Q.C.), T.O. Elias once asked two Ugandan Customary Law judges what they would do if 
A were to sue B for cheating A out of his proper share of the spoils of a joint raid on C’s banana 
plantation.  He said that the judges looked at each other with astonishment, laughed, and almost 
spontaneously responded that they would order both A and B arrested and C compensated.  The 
Q.C. was testing the geographic reach and relevance of some fundamental substantive rules of the 
law of contracts that he had studied at the University of London and the British Inns of Courts, and 
applied at the Peace Palace in The Hague.  (Q.C. or K.C. (King’s Counsel when there is a King) is a 
title given to the very elite of the English barristers.  See UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & 
ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE LAW:  CASES-TEXT-MATERIALS 644, 646 (7th ed. 
2009)).  The encounter symbolically confirmed his suspicion that substantive notions of fairness 
tend to converge notwithstanding profound diversity in human societies.  See T. OLAWALE ELIAS, 
THE NATURE OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 153 (1956).  Procedures are characterized by 
remarkable diversity.  Consider another of Judge Elias’s related experiments.  This particular 
instance involved a criminal court proceeding in Nigeria during British colonial rule.  The accused 
appeared before a British judge who was trained in the Common Law legal tradition.  The charge 
was riding a bike at night without a headlight.  The judge read the charges and asked the accused:  
“How do you plead?”  Failing to understand the question, the accused asked for clarification.  The 
judge then said:  “Are you guilty or not guilty?”  The accused grinned at the magistrate, shook his 
head, and retorted somewhat acidly:  “What a question!  Is that not what I have been dragging 
before you to find out?”  Id. at 299.  This Nigerian man sounds a lot like an immigrant in a 
deportation proceeding in Tacoma, Washington; York, Pennsylvania; Baltimore, Maryland, or any 
other location in America where deportation proceedings are regularly held.  Although the term 
‘immigrant’ has a specific meaning under the INA (defined in relation to the term non-immigrant), 
it is used here to suggest the noncitizen status of the person.  For the technical definition of an 
immigrant, see INA section 101(a)(15).  There are currently fifty-nine immigration courts 
throughout the country.  The Immigration Courts are within the EOIR, itself an agency of the 
Department of Justice.  Comprehensive information is available on the official website of the EOIR 
at http://www.justice.gov/eoir/index.html.  
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Unrepresented and confused,7 the typical immigrant does not know 
his role in the tripartite adversarial trial.8  During a master calendar 
hearing,9 for example, he is likely to understand the first two questions 
but nothing more.  The typical questions are as follows: “You are not a 
United States citizen.  Do you admit or deny?”  Fair enough—the 
immigrant admits it.10  Second, “You are a national of country X.”  
Again, the immigrant easily comprehends and admits the charge.  But 
this is typically the limit of his comprehension.  The next question may 
be: “You are removable under INA 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien 
inadmissible at the time of entry.11  Do you admit or deny?”  In most 
likelihood, this will be incomprehensible to the immigrant.  He may 
request translation into his native language, but the translation of the 
words alone is not helpful.12  Thoroughly confused, the immigrant 
 
 7. Although the noncitizen has the right to hire counsel, there is currently no right to 
appointed counsel.  See INA § 240(b)(4)(A); 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.3, 1292.1 (2006); see also Orantes-
Hernandez v. Thornburgh, 919 F.2d 549, 554 (9th Cir. 1990).  Finding pro bono representation is 
often very difficult for indigent respondents.  According to EOIR 2008 data, approximately 58 
percent of all respondents in deportation proceedings were not represented.  See STEPHEN H. 
LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M. RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 669 (5th 
ed. 2009) (citing 85 IR 2445 (Sept. 8, 2008)).  The percentage of detained noncitizens in removal 
proceedings who are not represented is currently 84 percent.  See ARNOLD PORTER LLP, AMERICAN 
BAR ASSOCIATION COMMISSION ON IMMIGRATION, REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM:  
PROPOSAL TO PROMOTE INDEPENDENCE, FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND PROFESSIONALISM IN THE 
ADJUDICATION OF REMOVAL CASES 5-8 (2010) [hereinafter ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM], available at 
http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.pdf. 
 8. Immigration Court proceedings are adversarial.  An immigration judge, who is an 
employee of the Department of Justice, i.e., EOIR, presides over the hearing.  The Government, i.e., 
the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), is represented by counsel who is an employee of the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) within the DHS.  As indicated above, the noncitizen, 
who may be represented at his own expense, is called the respondent.  For an excellent overview of 
the process, see Stephen H. Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, 59 DUKE L.J. 
1635, 1641-45 (2010). 
 9. ICE initiates removal proceedings by serving the alien a written notice called the Notice to 
Appear (NTA) under INA section 239(a)(1).  A Master Calendar hearing is a preliminary hearing 
designed to narrow the issues for a subsequent individual hearing.  The proceedings are governed by 
section 240 of the INA.  This section is discussed in detail in subsequent sections. 
 10. This assumption is fair in most cases, but it is important to note that even this could be a 
problem because it is possible that the alleged noncitizen is not actually a noncitizen, despite the 
belief to the contrary, as the citizenship law is complex.  See, e.g., INA § 320 (addressing the 
citizenship status of children born outside of the United States). 
 11. The grounds of inadmissibility are set forth under INA section 212(a)(1)(A).  A person 
who is inadmissible at the time of entry may be removed under INA section 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien 
removable as “[i]nadmissible at the time of entry.”  This notion is difficult to explain to the typical 
immigrant in removal proceedings. 
 12. Approximately 78 percent of all noncitizens in deportation proceedings need interpreters.  
Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1653 (citing TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE 
4
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would typically admit this last charge as well.  The judge would then 
say:  “On the basis of your admission, I hereby find you removable from 
the United States.”13  He would then ask:  “Do you want to apply for an 
affirmative relief?”14  Again, the immigrant would typically be at a loss, 
perhaps thinking the lack of comprehension might be a translation issue.  
After a lengthy back and forth between the immigrant respondent and 
the interpreter, an exchange which the judge typically would not 
understand, the respondent finally answers “no,” whereupon the judge 
proceeds to order the immigrant removed,15 and moves onto the next 
case.  Sometimes, if it appears to a sympathetic judge that the respondent 
is eligible for a form of affirmative relief, she might give the respondent 
a copy of the relevant application form with instructions to complete it 
and bring it back on a designated date.  Because the form is very 
technical and complicated, typically the immigrant would bring it back 
without having answered the questions properly.  Frustrated with the 
perceived incompetence, the judge may give the respondent another 
opportunity to fill it out, and might suggest that the respondent find an 
attorney.  Very often, the noncitizen would bring it back in exactly the 
same shape as before or with minimal inconsequential amendments 
because he could neither find a pro bono counsel nor understand the 
form any better than he did before.  For example, the detailed 
instructions that EOIR-42A, Application for Cancellation of Removal 
for Certain Permanent Residents, give include the following statement: 
Prior to service of the Notice to Appear, or prior to committing a 
criminal or related offense referred to in sections 212(a)(2) and 
237(a)(2) of the INA, or prior to committing a security or related 
offense referred to in section 237(a)(4) of the INA, you have at least 
seven (7) years continuous residence in the United States after having 
been lawfully admitted in any status[.]”16   
 
(TRAC), CASE BACKLOGS IN IMMIGRATION COURTS EXPAND, RESULTING WAIT TIMES GROW, 
http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/208/) (last visited Feb. 22, 2012). 
 13. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(1)(A). 
 14. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(4).  The types of affirmative relief include 
Cancellation of Removal under INA section 240A(a)-(b); Adjustment of Status under INA section 
245; Registration under INA section 249; Asylum under INA section 208, Withholding of Removal 
under INA section 241(b)(3); and relief under the United Nations Convention Against Torture, Dec. 
10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (incorporated into U.S. Law by the Foreign Affairs Reform and 
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681-761 (codified at 8 U.S.C § 1231 
Note).  For a discussion of the forms of affirmative relief, see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 
7, at 595-646. 
 15. This is pursuant to INA section 240(c)(1)(A). 
 16. See EOIR-42A, supra note 4, at 1 (instructions). 
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Even if the respondent has access to the referenced sections of the INA, 
the provisions are so technical and complex that the respondent’s 
attempts to decipher them would be in vain.  By this time, the judge 
would proceed to order the non-citizen deported, at the urging of the 
government’s counsel, and due to the judge’s patience being exhausted 
by the noncitizen’s inability to fill out this form properly!17  Typically, 
the government executes the order forthwith.18     
There is currently no credible opposition to the view that 
immigration adjudication in the United States is indefensibly flawed as it 
lacks accuracy, consistency, efficiency, and acceptability.19  Professor 
Legomsky describes the manifestations of the problem as “dubious and 
inconsistent outcomes; a lack of confidence in the results felt by parties, 
reviewing courts, and commentators; an extraordinary surge of requests 
for judicial review of the final administrative decisions; substantial 
duplication of effort; and lengthy delays.”20  Informed by several 
credible studies, Legomsky assessed the available evidence under four 
basic criteria:  accuracy, efficiency, acceptability, and consistency.21  He 
considers the system to have failed its purpose under all four criteria.22  
As of April 30, 2009, approximately 201,000 cases were pending for an 
average of 14.5 months before the nation’s approximate ranks of 214 
immigration judges.23  Each immigration law judge completes an 
estimated 4.3 cases per day.24  The inconsistencies are stark—they range 
 
 17. ICE attorneys invariably view their role as the adversary of the noncitizen.  See, e.g., ABA 
REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-60 (recommending that 
DHS should “clarify that the mission of the DHS attorney is to promote justice rather than to defeat 
the immigrants’ claims in every case.”). 
 18. This account is based on the author’s own observation of these proceedings for over seven 
years as a clinical professor supervising law students appearing as representatives in these 
proceedings.  The judge is required to advise the noncitizen that he would have the right to appeal 
under INA section 505(c)(1)-(2).  For the unrepresented noncitizen, this would be of no 
consequence. 
 19. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1645. 
 20. Id. at 1645.  The average immigration judge completes an average of 4.3 cases a day.  Id. 
at 1652. 
 21. Id. at 1645-51. 
 22. Id. at 1651.  Professor Legomsky is not alone in his critical result.  Several others consider 
the system to be a failure, including, most notably, the ABA’s Commission on Immigration.  See 
generally ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7.  
 23. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1648.  This number has fluctuated over time and it also 
appears that different reports tend to give slightly different figures.  For a tabular presentation of the 
available data and a good analysis of it, see generally Lenni B. Benson, You Can’t get There from 
Here:  Managing Judicial Review of Immigration Cases, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 405 (2007). 
 24. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1652.  
6
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from 5 to 88 percent approval rate within the same court system.25  
Represented asylum-seekers are almost three times more likely to 
prevail than unrepresented ones.26  About 84 percent of detained 
noncitizens in removal proceedings are unrepresented.27  Each of the 
fifteen members of the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) decides an 
average of about 2,500 cases annually or more than 50 cases per week.28  
The courts of appeals receive about 10,280 petitions for review, or about 
17 percent of the combined caseload of all circuit courts of appeals, 
which is said to be at a crisis level for these courts.29  They remand a 
significant proportion of these appeals because of inaccuracies and 
inconsistencies.30  Based on these glaring findings, Professor Legomsky 
concludes that “the current immigration adjudication system is 
fundamentally flawed.”31 
 
 25. See id. at 1650 n.71.  Several studies have shown these disparities, particularly in asylum 
adjudications.  See, e.g., Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Philip G. Schrag, Refugee 
Roulette: Disparities in Asylum Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 296 (2007) (“Colombian 
asylum applicants whose cases were adjudicated in the federal immigration court in Miami had a 
5% chance of prevailing with one of that court’s judges and an 88% chance of prevailing before 
another judge in the same building.  Half of the Miami judges deviated by more than 50% from the 
court’s mean grant rate for Colombian cases.”). 
 26. See Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25, at 340.  
 27. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 5-8. 
 28. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1654. 
 29. Id. at 1646-47.  In 2008, 41 percent of all cases pending before the 2nd Circuit Court of 
Appeals constituted immigration cases.  The corresponding figure for the 9th Circuit was 34 
percent. 
 30. Id. at 1647.  While the 2nd Circuit remanded 20 percent of the immigration cases, the 7th 
Circuit remanded 40 percent of all immigration cases.  Id.  A good demonstration of the frustration 
of the courts of appeals with immigration adjudication is Circuit Judge Posner’s statement in 
Benslimane v. Gonzales:  
This tension between judicial and administrative adjudicators is not due to judicial 
hostility to the nation’s immigration policies or to a misconception of the proper standard 
of judicial review of administrative decisions.  It is due to the fact that the adjudication 
of these cases at the administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of 
legal justice.  
430 F.3d 828, 829-30 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 31. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1651.  This problem of inefficiency and costliness is not 
unique to immigration.  It is a part of a more systemic problem across many areas.  Consider for 
example, Chief Justice Warren Burger’s statement about the civil justice system:  “Our system is 
too costly, too painful, too destructive, too inefficient for a truly civilized people.”  Ernst C. Stiefel 
& James R. Maxeiner, Civil Justice Reform in the United States—Opportunity for Learning from 
‘Civilized’ European Procedure Instead of Continued Isolation? 42  AM. J. COMP. L. 147, 148 
(1994) (quoting Address (Feb. 13, 1984)).  For a good discussion of the perceived deficiencies of 
the adversarial civil litigation and comparative assessment, see generally, Amalia D. Kessler, Our 
Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an Alternative to the 
Adversarial, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1181, 1188-91 (2005); John H. Langbein, The German 
Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 823, 824 (1985), and responses to this article, 
including Ronald J. Allen, Stefan Köck, Kurt Riecherberg & D. Toby Rosen, The German 
7
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In recent years, there has been serious recognition of these sobering 
facts, which has prompted a remarkable increase in reform proposals.32  
Perhaps the two most notable and comprehensive proposals are the 
proposal by the ABA Commission on Immigration, “Reforming the 
Immigration System,” and Professor Legomsky’s “Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication.”  These two works, like most others, focus 
on the macro-level issues, and seek solutions within the confines of the 
United States’ adversarial legal tradition.  Drawing on these works, this 
article focuses on the micro-level issues and draws some inspiration 
from the inquisitorial civil law techniques to suggest solutions that may 
improve the accuracy, efficiency, fairness, and acceptability of 
deportation procedures.    
Because judicial procedures often reflect society’s fundamental 
values and sensitivities,33 this article does not recommend the 
transplantation of the entire inquisitorial system.  However, this article 
argues that there is no principled reason why the basic tenets of the 
inquisitorial system cannot be adopted to improve the existing system of 
deportation proceedings.  As stated by Professors Glendon, Carozza, and 
Picker, “[t]he stimulus for comparative investigation is often a problem 
that one’s home system does not handle very well.”34  They are, 
however, careful to add that “when comparatists devote their attention to 
a vexing or unsolved problem, it is not with the idea that they will find 
in some foreign land a solution” but they seek the deepening of the 
 
Advantage in Civil Procedure:  A Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative 
Scholarship, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 705, 708-10, 12 (1988), and Samuel G. Gross, The American 
Advantage:  The Value of Inefficient Litigation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 734, 734 (1987). 
 32. One of the most highly developed proposals is Professor Legomsky’s Restructuring 
Immigration Adjudication, supra note 8.  This article draws extensively from Legomsky’s article, 
although it focuses on the micro-level issues of adjudication rather than the macro-level issues of 
decisional independence and structure.  This article also draws from the ABA REPORT ON 
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM.  The Report, prepared by Arnold and Porter for the ABA’s 
Commission on Immigration, is more than 200 pages long.  The full report is available on the ABA 
Website at http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/aba_complete_full_report.pdf.  The 
executive summary, which is 78 pages long, is available at 
http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/PublicDocuments/ReformingtheImmigrationSystemExecutiveSu
mmary.pdf. Other recent proposals include:  Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25 (proposing the 
conversion of the BIA into an Article I court); Benson, supra note 23 (urging a more careful 
examination of the ailments of the existing system of judicial review of immigration decisions 
before attempting to craft reforms). 
 33. See Kevin M. Clermont, Why Comparative Civil Procedure?, Preface to KUO-CHANG 
HUANG, INTRODUCING DISCOVERY INTO CIVIL LAW, at ix, xi-xix (2003), reprinted in THOMAS O. 
MAIN, GLOBAL ISSUES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 5 (2006). 
 34. MARY ANN GLENDON, PAOLO G. CAROZZA & COLIN B. PICKER, COMPARATIVE LEGAL 
TRADITIONS 7 (3d ed. 2007). 
8
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understanding of the problem within their own system.35  They continue 
stating that “our own way of doing things seems so natural to us that 
often it is only comparison with another way that establishes that there is 
something to be explained.”36  More importantly, as Professor Glendon 
suggests, comparative analysis may be necessary to “disrupt our settled 
understandings, leading us to new judgments and prompting new 
decisions, commitments and actions.”37  
Judge Walter Schaefer once noted, “The American system puts a 
premium on skill, adroitness, [and] even trickery, on both sides.”38  
Nowhere is this approach as evident as in deportation proceedings, 
where the combatants are the government’s ‘gladiator-attorneys’ who 
are “not primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win”39 on the 
one hand, and the unrepresented noncitizen on the other hand.  The 
process is moderated by a judge who the system deliberately keeps 
“ignorant and unprepared” so that she might neutrally observe the battle 
and declare the winner.40       
 
 35. Id.  
 36. Id. 
 37. MARY ANN GLENDON, STORY AND LANGUAGE IN AMERICA (lecture by), in GLENDON ET 
AL., COMPARATIVE LEGAL TRADITIONS, supra note 33, at 23. 
 38. Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1031, 
1048 n.44 (1975) (quoting Judge Walter V. Schaefer, Remarks).  Even Chief Justice Warren Burger 
praises the skillful lawyer who “tactfully destroys” his opponent in the court room.  See Warren E. 
Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy:  Are Specialized Training and Certification of Advocates 
Essential to Our System of Justice?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 227, 236 (1973).  He describes some 
skillful litigators as:  
[I]ntensely individualistic, but each was a lawyer for whom courtroom manners were a 
key weapon in his arsenal.  Whether engaged in the destruction of adverse witnesses or 
undermining damaging evidence or final argument, the performance was characterized 
by coolness, poise and graphic clarity, without shouting or ranting, and without baiting 
witnesses, opponents or the judge.  We cannot all be great advocates, but as every lawyer 
seeks to emulate tactics, he can approach, if not achieve, superior skill as an advocate.  
Id.   
 39. This term is used by Judge Marvin E. Frankel.  See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039 (“The 
litigator’s devices, let be clear, have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehoods, 
and thus exposing the truth.  But to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent 
weapons, equally, lethal for heroes and villains.  It is worth stressing, therefore, that the gladiator 
using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily crusading after the truth, but seeking to win.  If 
this is banal, it is also overlooked too much . . . .”). 
 40. The terms ‘ignorant’ and ‘unprepared’ are used by Judge Frankel.  See id. at 1042.  The 
whole passage, which is very instructive, reads:  
The ignorance and unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms of the system.  The 
“facts” are to be found and asserted by the contestants.  The judge is not to have 
investigated or explored the evidence before trial.  No one is to have done it for him.  
The judicial counterpart in civil law countries, with the file of the investigating 
magistrate before him, is a deeply “alien” conception . . . Without an investigative file, 
the American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in spasms as sudden 
9
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An observer familiar with the adjudicatory processes in both the 
adversarial (accusatorial) common law legal tradition and the 
investigative (inquisitorial) civil law legal tradition41 puzzles over this 
process and the immigration judge’s answer to the student’s question 
mentioned above.  Thus, the most fundamental question that this article 
raises would be:  Is there any justifiable reason why deportation 
proceedings should be adversarial when in the great majority of cases 
the only two lawyers in the courtroom are the government’s counsel and 
the judge?  It answers the question in the negative and argues that 
deportation proceedings combine the worst aspects of the adversarial 
and inquisitorial legal traditions because of two primary reasons:  (1) the 
judge is neither completely passive-reflective nor neutral as she is 
statutorily required to probe credibility through cross examination; (2) 
She is prohibited from assuming an investigative role because her 
mandate is limited to the adjudication of cases on the record i.e., on the 
basis of party submission alone.42  The article further argues that the 
system’s use of about 950 government attorneys43 as the noncitizens’ 
 
flashes of seeming light may lead to mislead him at odd times.  
Id.  Although this generally holds true in deportation proceedings, there are some peculiarities, 
which will be elaborated further in Part II infra.  This ‘battle’ is also sometimes described as a 
“duel.”  See JOHN BELL, SOPHIE BOYRON & SIMON WHITTAKER, PRINCIPLES OF FRENCH LAW 86 
(2d ed. 2008). 
 41. On the use of terminology, Professor Glenn writes that in the civil law legal tradition, the 
legal process is really not called anything, but that common law lawyers often call it, somewhat 
pejoratively, “inquisitorial.”  He suggests that it could properly be called “investigative.”  He also 
notes that civil law lawyers correspondingly call the common law’s adversarial system 
“accusatorial.”  See H. PATRICK GLENN, LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD 144 & n.47 (4th ed. 
2010).  Despite this suggestion, however, for ease of reference and simplicity, this article uses the 
terms inquisitorial and investigative, and adversarial and accusatorial interchangeably where 
appropriate.  One of the important notes that Professor Glenn offers is the notion that in the 
inquisitorial system, the law is written.  “Since it exists it must be enforced, and judges have to 
actively establish the facts which justify its application.”  Id. at 144.  This notion will be elaborated 
throughout this article. 
 42. Another related reason why the existing system is the worst of two worlds is that fact that 
it is not considered adversarial in the legal sense while there is no doubt that it is effectively 
adversarial.  In Ardestani v. INS, the Supreme Court held that for purposes of recovery of attorney’s 
fees and expenses under the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA) deportation proceedings are not 
considered adversarial.  The effect of that ruling is the unlike in other proceedings where a winning 
party may recover attorney’s fees and other expenses from the government if the government had 
taken a position that is not “substantially justified.”  See Ardestani v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 132-33, 
138-39 (1991), discussed in LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 683.  For a detailed 
presentation of the argument that the existing system is in fact the worst of two worlds, see infra 
Part III.  
 43. There are currently 712 ICE attorneys who represent the DHS in removal proceedings.  
The Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) within the DOJ also has 239 attorneys.  Currently the 
total number is 951.  See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1701.    
10
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adversaries in deportation cases not only adds significant cost and 
inefficiency but also compromises accuracy in proceedings.44  It then 
asks what would happen if these many government attorneys are 
converted into administrative law judges with inquisitorial functions.45  
Wouldn’t we save a significant amount of money, increase efficiency, 
and provide a more accurate result?46  The article answers this question 
in the affirmative and offers the reasons.47     
With this background, the article is divided into five sections.  To 
help answer the question why different systems adopt different 
procedural methods for the resolution of legal controversies and why we 
have the system that we do, the second section traces the origins and 
development of the common law and civil law legal traditions and 
outlines the differences in their techniques of adjudication.  It also 
provides a comparative analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of 
each system, focusing on the roles and responsibilities of judges and 
party litigants in civil, criminal, and administrative contexts.   
The assignment of adjudicative functions to administrative 
agencies, which was a function of the rise of the administrative state, has 
not produced a uniform model.  While some agencies, like the Social 
Security Administration, follow what appears to be the inquisitorial 
model, others, such as the immigration system, follow what is decidedly 
adversarial model.  The third section discusses the default importation of 
the adversarial system into immigration proceedings and critically 
examines the effects of the adversarial system and outlines its 
shortcomings.  The fourth section provides a brief but detailed summary 
of the existing diagnostics and reform proposals.  Bringing the 
discussions in the previous four sections to bear, the fifth section 
outlines the advantages that the inquisitorial system may have in the 
deportation context and shows how the replacement of the adversarial 
system with the inquisitorial system could improve the existing system 
of adjudication by significantly increasing efficiency, reducing cost, and 
improving accuracy and acceptability.  The sixth section offers a 
summary of conclusions.       
 
 44. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see infra Part IV.  
 45. Issues of importation of prosecutorial bias could be recognized and addressed.  For a 
fuller discussion, see Section IV infra.  
 46. Bearing the cost of appointed counsel is the most obvious measure that could even the 
playing field.  Although that will be a very welcome development if it happens, which will not be 
anytime soon, this article argues that even then, the system would face the same kinds of problems 
that the public defenders system is facing in terms of effectiveness of representation and that the 
inquisitorial model could be more efficient and fair.    
 47. For a detailed discussion of this proposition, see infra Part IV.  
11
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II.  THE DIVERSITY OF ADJUDICATORY SYSTEMS:  ADVERSARIAL AND 
INQUISITORIAL JUSTICE  
The divergence between the common law and civil law legal 
traditions is not limited to the procedures of adjudication.48  However, 
this section focuses on the diversity of approaches and techniques of 
adjudication in these systems.  Neither system is uniform across 
different geographic areas.  Recognizing the considerable diversity 
within each system, this section focuses on the most common features of 
each system for purposes of comparison.49  To provide context, it begins 
with a brief description of the genesis of each system.    
A. Adversarial Justice 
The origins of the English common law are often traced to the 1066 
Norman Conquest of England.50  Rooted in the centralized 
administration of William, Conqueror at Hastings, English common law 
“grew in rugged exclusiveness, disdaining fellowship with the more 
polished learning of the civilians.”51   
The common law, which is essentially a system of writs,52 is 
characterized as “a law of procedure; whatever substantive law existed 
was hidden by it, ‘secreted in its interstices’.”53  Traditionally, to bring a 
legal action, the plaintiff had to identify the right writ and bring it before 
a jury which “enjoyed a monopoly on . . . substantive decision 
making.”54  When there was no applicable writ available, there was no 
action or remedy.55  Because the actual decision making on the facts and 
the applicable law was left to the jury, the judge’s responsibility was 
 
 48. Other divergences are related to the theory and sources of law, constitutional and judicial 
structure, basic assumptions, and values.  See MATTEI, supra note 6, at 25. 
 49. “It cannot be doubted that such typical features exist and distinguish civil law procedure 
from common law (especially American) procedure.”  MATTEI, supra note 6, at 707. 
 50. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 153.  
 51. Id. at 153-54 (quoting [VOL] FREDERICK POLLOCK AND FREDERIC WILLIAM MAITLAND, 
THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2d ed. 1898, reissued in 1968)).  
For the history of this development, see id. at 153-69. 
 52. A writ is basically an instruction from the Crown to an officer, usually the sheriff, to 
investigate a legal dispute.  See GLENN, supra note 41, at 243.  According to Professor Glenn, by 
the middle of the thirteenth century, there were about 50 writs and that number grew by only 25 in 
the six centuries that followed.  Id.  
 53. See id. 
 54. Id.  
 55. Id.  This notion is usually stated as “where there is no writ there is no right.”  GLENDON 
ET AL., supra note 34, at 158. 
12
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essentially jurisdictional, i.e., to determine whether the said action fit the 
chosen writ.56  
As Professor Glenn neatly describes, the jury was originally 
supposed to know everything about the case, including the facts and the 
law, which was essentially a local matter.57  Thus, the duty of the 
parties’ advocates was essentially to argue whether the outcome they 
sought from the jury was authorized and required by the applicable 
writ.58  As the judicial system evolved, even to the point “when 
witnesses eventually came to be necessary, the lawyer continued to 
plead to issue, and now brought forth the facts they needed” to prevail 
under the writ.59 
The judge had no responsibility of finding ‘objective’ facts; nor did the 
lawyers.  There was no external law stating with precision the facts to 
which it applied.  Since the members of the jury had day jobs, and 
were usually illiterate, the argument and proof had to be made orally, 
in what came to be known as a trial (as in the old trial by ordeal . . . 
.).60 
In particular, Glenn goes on describing the judge’s role in these 
terms: 
The trial is a dramatic event in which the judge plays a commanding, 
but distant, role, as befitting a source of law.  Freed from the burden of 
finding fact, advised on law and fact by the barristers . . . the judge 
could concentrate on the general contours of the writs [and] the general 
contours of the law.  Judicial rulings by a very small number of royal 
judges working out of Westminster on circuit eventually came to 
define the ambit of the writs . . . .61 
Writs gradually developed into substantive common law,62 but they 
originally “reflected, above all, an agrarian, non-commercial, even 
 
 56. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 243. 
 57. Id.  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. at 243-44. 
 61. Id. at 244 (footnotes omitted).  “The writs were fundamental, however, since they 
determined when you could get to the jury, and they became the best available indicators of a 
secreted, substantive, common law.”  Id. 
 62. Id.  The most common writs included: writ of ejectment, the writs of debts and covenants, 
writs for trespass, assault or battery, etc.  Id. at 245.  The historical context that necessitated the 
development of the common law is interesting.  According to Glenn, “[t]he Normans incorporated 
the local jury into the working of their new, modern, royal courts” because they did not want to 
appear to be imposing their own laws on the locals, who were defeated militarily but had to be 
governed by law.  Glenn further asks, “How could you get rid of all the local, informal traditions, 
13
Kidane: The Inquisitorial Advantage
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2012
11- KIDANE_MACRO.DOCM 7/16/2012  11:04 AM 
660 AKRON LAW REVIEW [45:647 
chthonic society.”63  Being deeply indigenous and complex, the common 
law enjoyed an appreciable degree of ‘impermeability’ or even 
‘immunity’ from outside influence, particularly the civil law.64  
Although it has undergone fundamental changes over the centuries, it is 
still “the same ship.”65     
The most common Norman method of resolving disputes was a 
“trial by battle,” which determined who the “better man” was, or who 
deserved the legal victory.66  Trial by ordeal was another common 
method.67  Even after the jury was put to use for purposes of the 
administration of justice, it was in the context of bringing more 
witnesses to attest in favor of one or the other party.68  At some point, 
one who could produce twelve jurors to testify on his behalf was 
considered a winner.  Thus, the aim of both parties was to produce more 
jurors than his adversary.69 
It was during the reign of King Henry II that the jury system was 
devised as a tool for the administration of justice.70  The use by circuit 
courts of juries made perfect sense as the judges were outsiders and the 
jurors were informed commoners.71  The jury was eventually 
transformed from a body of informant men to a body of men that would 
hear information from others and make a decision based on that 
information.72    
 
nesting here and there in the countryside?  And with what?”  He goes on to answer his own 
questions:  “The process of insinuating a common law into a vigorous, and not very friendly, 
society, was a major undertaking, to be pursued on many fronts.”  Id. at 247. 
 63. Id. at 245. 
 64. Id.  Professor Glenn suggests that the claim of immunity is perhaps exaggerated as there 
have been notable influences and counter-influences of the systems.  Id.  
 65. See id. at 253-69.  The jury is at the center of the adversarial trial.  The jury has been 
described by Pope Innocent III as “a peculiarly English institution.”  See LoRD DEVLIN, TRIAL BY 
JURY 4 (1966), excerpted in GLENDON, supra note 34, at 520-21.  Its origin is very interesting; 
historically, it had nothing to do with the administration of justice.  The Normans brought the 
concept with them to England as a means of collecting information from the local people.  Id. at 
520-22.  A juror was a man who would take an oath and provide information to the King for 
administrative purposes.  He had to be a member of the community and had to possess some 
knowledge about the day to day life of the people.  If the King was needed to rule on an issue, he 
would typically rely on the sworn statement of jurors.  The jury only came to be associated with the 
administration of justice as a later development.  Id.  
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  Historically, all civil cases in England were tried by jury until the year 1854, at which 
point the use of the jury began to decline.  See Ward v. James, [1966] Q.B. 273 [Eng.]. in GLENDON 
14
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The adversarial trial is divided into the pretrial phase and the trial 
phase, where discovered evidence is presented, was in part necessitated 
by the need to accommodate the schedules of twelve jurors, the 
disputing parties, and the judge.73  This division has continued to be the 
hallmark of the common law legal tradition, including in the United 
Sates.74  In other words, the drama of adversarial advocacy, originally 
designed to educate, persuade, and influence illiterate jurors,75 has 
continued to dominate modern adversarial trials, even when a jury is not 
involved.76  
Although the system of an adversarial trial, as Chief Justice Burger 
said, is “a child of the common law, the [American] legal profession has 
developed in ways that do not parallel England’s.”77  For example, 
England has long abandoned the use of the jury in most civil cases, 
though America still maintains the option.78  Pretrial discovery is now 
uniquely American,79 and the training, licensure, and discipline of 
American lawyers are also significantly different than those of their 
English counterparts.80  
As far as criminal justice is concerned, in England before the 16th 
century, a person accused of a criminal offense did not have the right to 
representation if accused of a felony, had no access to the government’s 
evidence, and did not have the right to present his own evidence.81  
 
ET AL., supra note 34, at 525.  In 1933 the British Parliament enacted the Administration of Justice 
Act, limiting the use of civil jury to limited actions as a matter of right and giving the judge the 
discretion whether to involve a jury in all other cases.  The excepted cases were fraud, libel, slander, 
malicious prosecution, false imprisonment, seduction, or breach of promise to marriage.  Id.  The 
result was dramatic—the Act effectively killed the civil jury in England.  Id. at 532.  By the time 
Ward v. James was decided in 1966, only 2 percent of civil cases were tried by jury.  Ward 
considered issues relating to the exercise of discretion by the judge to involve or not to involve the 
jury.  See generally id. at 524-30.  Ward is considered the principal case that effectively marked the 
end of the civil jury system in England.  See id. at 532.  
 73. See MATTEI ET AL., supra note 6, at 761. 
 74. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Discovery and the Role of the Judge in Civil Law 
Jurisdictions, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1017, 1020 (1998). 
 75. See GLENN, supra note 41, at 244. 
 76. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1019-20. 
 77. See Burger, supra note 38, at 227.  According to the Chief Justice, the “turbulent 
diversity” makes “it impossible to transplant the English system . . . .”  See id.  The basic features of 
the adversarial model remain similar. 
 78. See id. at 228. 
 79. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1018. 
 80. See Burger, supra note 38, at 227-30.  This citation does not endorse the Chief Justice’s 
suggestion that English barristers are better trained, better disciplined, and generally better equipped 
than American lawyers who receive the training differently; the citation is for the difference in the 
training. 
 81. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 251-52. 
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Moreover, he would remain detained throughout the entire trial 
process.82  Although the rights of the accused have improved 
dramatically since then, particularly since the mid-19th century, “the 
process nevertheless retains elements of the earlier trial—that notion that 
it is a form of combat.”83   
Be that as it may, “[A]ll the common law systems begin with a 
concept of the adversary system, which defines the roles of the judge 
and the parties’ advocates.”84  While the role of the judge remains that of 
judging between competing presentations of evidence, facts and law, the 
role of the party litigants is to provide such presentation.85 
The judge is not responsible for there being an adequate development 
of the evidence during trial and a fortiori is not responsible for there 
being adequate pretrial discovery of evidence.  Nor is the judge 
responsible for getting at “the truth.”  The judge simply chooses 
between the contentions of law and the versions of facts laid before 
him by the parties.86 
The objective of all systems of adjudication is presumably to find 
out the truth and arrive at a just result.87  Different systems attempt to 
accomplish this objective through different means.  As a prelude for the 
comparative analysis that follows, consider the adversarial posture in our 
system.  The lawyers on each side are supposed to be active, responsive, 
imaginative, and partisan advocates, while the judge is required to be 
passive, reflective, and neutral.88  Asked if zealous advocacy by 
President Nixon’s counsels would “involve [the] country in confusion,” 
Dean Monroe Freedman, a renowned legal scholar in the field of legal 
ethics, said that the adversarial system envisions the same kind of 
advocacy on both sides.89  As support for his argument, he quoted Lord 
Brougham’s statement given in 1812 in the Trial of Queen Caroline:   
[A]n advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all 
the world, and that person is his client.  To save that client by all 
 
 82. See id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1019 (footnotes omitted).  
 85. Id. 
 86. Id.  
 87. This notion and the controversies surrounding it are elaborated further at the end of this 
section.  
 88. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1033 (citing DAVID W. PECK, THE COMPLEMENT OF COURT 
AND COUNSEL 9 (1954) (13th Annual Benjamin N. Cardozo Lecture)). 
 89. See id. at 1036 & n.14 (citing Freedman, The President’s Advocate and the Public Trust, 
N.Y.U. L.J., Mar. 27, 1974, at 1, Col. 1 and 2.) 
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means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, 
and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in 
performing this duty he must not regard the alarm, the torments, the 
destruction which he may bring upon others.  Separating the duty of a 
patriot from that of an advocate, he must go on reckless of 
consequences, though it should be his unhappy fate to involve his 
country in confusion.90 
Almost amused by these statements, Human Rights First Founder, 
former Columbia Law Professor, and pioneer of the Federal Sentencing 
guidelines, Judge Marvin Frankel,91 surmised that “[n]either the 
sentiment nor even the words sound archaic after a century and half.”92  
Perhaps no writing has so effectively captured the shortcomings of 
the adversarial system as Judge Frankel’s University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review article.  Displaying his renowned, unique, and beautiful 
writing, Judge Frankel’s message is best presented by generous resort to 
his own words.  In response to Dean Freedman’s statement about 
Nixon’s attorneys’ above, he noted that 
[t]his is a topic on which our profession has practiced some self-
deception.  We proclaim to each other and to the world that the clash 
of adversaries is a powerful means for hammering out the truth.  
Sometimes, less guardedly, we say it is ‘best calculated to getting out 
all the facts . . . .’93   
Having acknowledged that the adversarial technique might be useful in 
ironing out the truth within certain limits, he goes on to state that 
[d]espite our untested statements of self-congratulation, we know that 
others searching after facts—in history, geography, medicine, 
whatever—do not emulate our adversary system.  We know that most 
countries of the world seek justice by different routes.  We know that 
many of the rules and devices of adversary litigation as we conduct it 
are not geared for, but are often aptly suited to defeat, the development 
of the truth.  We are unlikely ever to know how effectively the 
adversary technique would work toward truth if that were the objective 
of the contestants.94 
 
 90. The story and the quotation are provided in Frankel, supra note 38, at 1036 (citing 2 
TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821)). 
 91. It is believed that the Sentencing Guidelines substantially deviated from his original 
proposals.   
 92. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1036. 
 93. Id. at 1036-37 (quoting PECK, supra note 88, at 9). 
 94. Id.  
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The respective role of the contestants is what concerns him the most.  
“Employed by interested parties, the process often achieves truth only as 
a convenience, a byproduct, or an accidental approximation.  The 
business of the advocate, simply stated, is to win if possible without 
violating the law.”95  Judge Frankel summarizes his above analysis with 
a remarkable conclusion:  “[The role of the attorney] is not the search for 
truth as such.  To put that thought more exactly, the truth and victory are 
mutually incompatible for some considerable percentage of the attorneys 
trying cases at any given time.”96 
Judge Frankel goes on to describe the reason why the system 
incentivizes victory at the expanse of the truth or just result.  “The 
devices are too familiar to warrant more than a fleeting reminder.  To 
begin with, we leave most of the investigatory work to paid partisans, 
which is scarcely a guarantee of thorough and detached exploration.  Our 
courts wait passively for what the parties will present, almost never 
knowing—often not suspecting—what the parties have chosen not to 
present.”97  There is also the problem of the rules of professional 
responsibility.   
The ethical standards governing counsel command loyalty and zeal for 
the client, but no positive obligation at all to the truth.  Counsel must 
not knowingly break the law or commit or countenance fraud.  Within 
these unconfining limits, advocates freely employ time-honored tricks 
and stratagems to block or distort the truth.  The litigator’s devices 
have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehoods, and 
thus exposing the truth.”98 
But again,  
to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent weapons, 
equally lethal for heroes and villains.  It is worth stressing, therefore, 
that the gladiator using the weapons in the courtroom is not primarily 
crusading after truth, but seeking to win.  If this is banal, it is also 
overlooked too much . . . .99 
If the parties’ attorneys are warring gladiators, what are the rules of 
engagement?  Circuit Judge Jerome Frank answers this question in his 
 
 95. Id. at 1037. 
 96. Id. (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. at 1038. 
 98. Id.  
 99. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).  
18
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/5
11- KIDANE_MACRO.DOCM 7/16/2012  11:04 AM 
2012] THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE 665 
very successful book, “Courts on Trial,”100 which devotes some focus to 
lessons that trial lawyers learn on how to handle witnesses.  Permeating 
this topic is the repeated fact that the attorney’s quest is not for the truth, 
but for success.  First, lawyers choose witnesses very carefully not 
entirely based on what they know and what they can say, but based on 
how they will do, or what they will say and how convincingly they will 
say it, in court.101  Second, if a witness appears to have deficiencies in 
their story telling, the lawyer works closely with them to make sure that 
they overcome those deficiencies and present the best demeanor before 
the court.  Third, the lawyer will do the exact opposite to the opposing 
witnesses; they will try every trick known to man to annoy and discredit 
an otherwise credible witness.102  One lesson for lawyers advises them 
to try to discredit an honest and credible witness “by making him appear 
more hostile than he really is.  You may make him exaggerate or unsay 
something and say it again.”103  Another lesson reads: 
An intimidating manner in putting questions may so coerce or 
disconcert the witness that his answers do not represent his actual 
knowledge on the subject.  So also, questions which in form or subject 
cause embarrassment, shame or anger in the witness may unfairly lead 
him to such demeanor or utterances that the impression produced by 
his statements does not do justice to its real testimonial value.104 
 
 100. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL:  MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN JUSTICE 82-86 
(1973). 
 101. Id. at 80.  
 102. Id. at 82-86. 
 103. Id. at 82.  
 104. Id. at 82-83.  Judge Frank quotes Anthony Trollope’s dramatic commentary on the nature 
of this form of adversarial advocacy.  The quote is reproduced below, as it is very instructive: 
One would naturally imagine that an undisturbed thread of clear evidence would be best 
obtained from a man whose position was made easy and whose mind was not harassed; 
but this is not the fact; to turn a witness to good account he must be badgered this way 
and that till he nearly mad; he must be made a laughing-stock for the court; his very truth 
must be turned into falsehoods, so that he may be falsely shamed; he must be accused of 
all manners of villainy, threatened with all manners of punishment; he must be made to 
feel that he has no friend near him, the world is all against him; he must be confounded 
till he forget his right hand from his left, till his mind be turned into chaos, and his heart 
into water; and then let him give evidence.  What will fall from his lips when in wretch 
collapse must be of special value, for the best talents of practiced forensic heroes are 
daily used to bring it about; and no member of the Human Society interferes to protect 
the wretch.  Some sorts of torture are as it were tacitly allowed even among humane 
people.  Eels are skinned alive, and witnesses are scarified, and no one’s blood curdles at 
the sight, no soft hear is sickened at the cruelty.  
Id.  At the end of this quote, Professor Frank notes that, because of this kind of terror of cross-
examination, the retention of a counsel who know how to do this well could even force a settlement.  
Id. 
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These and so many other trial and cross-examination techniques are 
purposefully designed to mislead the trial judge or jury.  Judge Frank 
concludes:  
In short, the lawyer aims at victory, at winning in the fight, not at 
aiding the court to discover the facts.  He does not want the trial court 
to reach a sound educated guess, if it is likely to be contrary to his 
client’s interest.  Our present trial method is thus the equivalent of 
throwing pepper in the eyes of a surgeon when he is performing an 
operation.105 
If litigators, described as fighters by Judge Frank and as gladiators 
who only care about winning and not crusading after the truth by Judge 
Frankel, are to engage entirely in devious and cunning advocacy, how 
may the only other party in the courtroom, i.e., the judge, make sure that 
the truth is revealed and justice is done?  Again, Judge Frankel’s 
analysis of the judge’s role in the adversarial system is extremely 
instructive:  
The fact is that our system does not allow much room for effective or 
just intervention by the trial judge in the adversary fight about the 
facts.  The judge views the case from a peak of Olympian ignorance.  
His intrusions will in too many cases result from partial or skewed 
insights.  He may expose the secrets one side chooses to keep while 
never becoming aware of the other’s.  He runs a good chance of 
pursuing inspirations that better informed counsel have considered, 
explored, and abandoned after fuller study.106   
It is interesting to note that, in this kind of system, the judge’s 
interventions could even have negative repercussions.  This is so, 
according to Judge Frankel, because  
[h]e risks at a minimum the supplying of more confusion than 
guidance by his sporadic intrusions.  The ignorance and 
unpreparedness of the judge are intended axioms of the system.  The 
‘facts’ are to be found and asserted by the contestants.  The judge is 
not to have investigated or explored the evidence before trial.  No one 
 
 105. Id. at 85 (emphasis added).  Even those who consider the adversarial system to have more 
merits than demerits in helping the system arrive at a just result highlight the harmfulness of the 
usual advice to witnesses and their treatment in court.  See generally, Stephen McG. Bundy & Einer 
Richard Elhauge, Do Lawyers Improve the Adversarial System?  A General Theory of Litigation 
Advice and Its Regulation, 79 CALIF. L. REV. 313 (1991) (testing different theories on the subject 
and generally that lawyer advice to clients helps the court to arrive at the right decision, but 
recognizes the fact that advise to testifying witnesses generally have negative impact on the finding 
of the truth).   
 106. See Frankel, supra note 38, at 1042. 
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/5
11- KIDANE_MACRO.DOCM 7/16/2012  11:04 AM 
2012] THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE 667 
is to have done it for him . . . The judicial counterpart in civil law 
countries, with the file of the investigating magistrate before him, is a 
deeply “alien” conception . . . Without an investigative file, the 
American trial judge is a blind and blundering intruder, acting in 
spasms as sudden flashes of seeming light may lead or mislead him at 
odd times.  The ignorant and unprepared judge is the properly bland 
figurehead in the adversary scheme of things.107   
Judge Frankel then concludes:  
In a system that so values winning and deplores losing, where lawyers 
are trained to fight for, not to judge, their clients, where we learn as 
advocates not to ‘know’ inconvenient things, moral elegance is not to 
be expected.  The morals of the arena and the morals of the 
marketplace . . . tend powerfully to shape our conduct.108 
Of course, at the center of this discussion is a more fundamental 
doctrinal dilemma as to the role of the judiciary in a republic.  A story 
recounted by Judge Charles Wyzanski about an interesting encounter 
between Judge Learned Hand and Mr. Justice Holmes neatly 
summarizes the basic doctrinal problem.  According to Judge Wyzanski, 
when Learned Hand was still a district court judge, he went to 
Washington, D.C. to visit Justice Holmes.109  Among the cases that 
Justice Holmes was to review were supposedly several cases decided at 
the trial level by Judge Hand.110  At the end of the visit, Justice Holmes 
gave Judge Hand a ride on his carriage on his way to the Supreme Court 
building.111  As Judge Hand stepped out of the carriage, he waved 
goodbye to Justice Holmes and said:  “Do justice, Sir.”  In response, 
 
 107. Id.  He goes on describing the unbalanced system:  
[B]ecause the parties and counsel control the gathering and presentation of evidence, we 
have made no fixed, routine, expected place for the judge’s contributions . . . As a result, 
[the trial judge’s] interruptions are just that—interruptions:  occasional, unexpected, 
sporadic, unprogrammed, and unduly dramatic because they are dissonant and out of 
character. 
Id. 
 108. Id. at 1051 (emphasis added).  This passive role of the judge in the adversarial system has 
been expressed in many other ways.  For example, Mr. Justice Holmes has been quoted as saying:  
[T]he judge’s function [is] interstitial; molecular, not molar.  Or to put it more dramatic 
terms, the judge was like the Greek chorus in Greek tragedy, not a principal actor but an 
interpreter of the actors.  His grace was the grace of forbearance and sympathetic 
understanding; not his share the action and passion of his time except in after dinner 
speeches.  
See Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., Equal Justice Through Law, 47 TUL. L. REV. 951, 954-55 (1973).  
 109. Id. at 955. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. 
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“Holmes beckoned to him and said, ‘Sonny, come back here.  You don’t 
understand my job.  It is to apply the law.’”112  This anecdote is an 
excellent demonstration of the conflicting schools of thought on the role 
of the judiciary, commonly known as the conflict between interpretive 
judges and activist judges.113  This fundamental debate manifests itself 
at the micro level in the courtrooms, and in the attitudes demonstrated by 
the immigration judge’s response mentioned at the beginning of the 
introduction and by Justice Holmes in responding to Judge Hand’s 
seemingly idealistic farewell.  
B. Inquisitorial Justice 
How does the inquisitorial system address some of the same 
problems differently?  A brief historical survey provides context.  The 
literature classifies the origin of the civil law into two families:  
Romanic and Germanic.114  Owing to centuries of interaction, influence, 
and counterinfluence, the origins have played a steadily diminishing role 
in explaining the natures and states of the existing systems.  Italian 
scholar Giuseppe Chiovenda once commented that the contemporary 
Italian procedure can be said to be “neither more Roman nor less 
Germanic than the existing procedure of Germany.”115  However, a brief 
discussion of the origins will be useful in understating the existing 
peculiarities of the system.          
Roman law has a very long history, but Justinian’s sixth century 
Corpus Juris Civilis is considered to be the most natural starting point 
for purposes of contemporary analysis of the civil law legal tradition.116  
The Corpus Juris Civilis consisted of four parts:  The Code, which is the 
collection of Roman legislation; the Digest, which is a treatise of the 
most important writings; the Novels, which is imperial legislation 
enacted in the years following the compilations of the Code and the 
Digest; and finally the Institute, which is an introductory text for 
 
 112. Recounted in id. 
 113. See id.  
 114. The countries that are believed to be within the Romanic family include France, Italy, 
Spain, Portugal, Belgium, the Netherlands, most countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.  The 
countries within the Germanic family include Austria, Switzerland, and Japan.  See MATTEI ET AL., 
supra note 6, at 710. 
 115. Id. at 709 (quoting Giuseppe Chiovenda, Roman and Germanic Elements in Continental 
Civil Procedure, in ENGELMANN, A HISTORY OF CONTINENTAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 875, 833, 912 
(1983)). 
 116. The history stretches as far back as 450 B.C., i.e., the time of the Twelve Tables.  See 
GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 18-20. 
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students.117  The Code and the Digest together are considered to 
represent an authoritative restatement of Roman law.118   
Having remained dormant for centuries following the end of 
Justinian’s reign,119 the Corpus Juris Civilis was rediscovered in Italy 
around the 11th century.120  After the rediscovery, the University of 
Bologna became the center of the study of legal science in Europe.121  
With the benefit of this very reaching and intellectually challenging set 
of ancient legal materials, legal scholarship flourished and numerous 
legal thinkers emerged, including Sir Thomas Aquinas in the 13th 
century.122  According to Professor Glendon, thousands of European law 
students who came to study in Bologna took back home with them not 
only the laws that they studied but also the methods of their teaching.123  
In this organic fashion, Roman law quickly spread throughout Europe 
and beyond.124  Glendon suggests that its perceived intellectual 
superiority is among those factors to be credited for its widespread 
appeal and acceptance.125          
The French Civil Code of 1804, which is commonly known as 
“Code Napoleon,” is now considered to be the pioneer of the modern 
Civil Code, and consequently the most influential.126  The German Civil 
 
 117. Id. at 20. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Professor Glenn notes that during this period of about 500 years, which followed the fall 
of the Roman Empire, various kinds of chthonic laws re-asserted themselves across Europe and 
elsewhere.  See GLENN, supra note 41, at 145.   
 120. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 24-25.  Before that, it had served different rulers 
through the ages.  The Germans used it in ruling what was previously part of the Roman Empire.  
According to Glendon:  
Crude versions of Roman legal rules had become intermingled in varying degrees with 
the customary rules of the Germanic invaders to the point where historians speak of the 
laws during this period as either ‘Romanized customary laws’ or barbarized Roman 
laws.  Thus, though Roman legal science and Classical Roman law disappeared in the 
welter, diversity and localism of Carbonnier’s ‘customary thicket’, Romanist elements 
survived and served both as a strand of continuity, and latent, potential universalizing 
factor in what we now think of as the civil law tradition.  
Id. at 22. 
 121. Id. at 24-25.  
 122. Id. at 25.  
 123. See id. at 26. 
 124. Id.  
 125. Id. at 25. 
 126. Id. at 34.  The French Code was by no means the first of the modern codes, but it was the 
most successful.  Professor René David attributes the successes to two factors:  (1) it was the work 
of an enlightened sovereign, (2) which was powerful enough to influence its acceptance.  See 
DAVID & BRIERLEY, supra note 6, at 64-65.  The failed prior codes include the Prussian 
Allgemeines Landrecht of 1794, and the Austrian Civil Code of 1811.  See id. at 65. 
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Code of 1896 became perhaps the second most influential.127  Although 
the French and German Civil Codes grew from the same roots, they took 
divergent approaches and developed individually.128  The French Code, 
drafted by a commission of four prominent jurists within a very short 
period of time and with a touch of the ideals of the revolution,129 was 
always meant to be flexible, general, and able to be understood by 
ordinary citizens.130  The German Civil Code, on the other hand, was a 
very detailed project that took ‘legal scientists’ twenty years to 
complete.131  
It was constructed and worked out with the degree of technical 
precision that had never been seen before in any legislation.  A special 
language was developed and employed consistently.  Legal concepts 
were defined and then used in the same way throughout.  Sentence 
construction indicated the location of the burden of proof.  Through 
elaborate cross-references, all parts of the Code supposedly interlocked 
to form a logically closed system.”132   
While the French Code was adopted at the beginning of the industrial 
revolution, the German Code had the benefit of being adopted at the end 
of that era.133  German legal thought, including legal realism, 
jurisprudence of interests and sociological schools of thought, came to 
have far-reaching influence across the world, including in the United 
States.134  This brief discussion of the historical origin and evolution of 
the civil law system is offered not only to show the divergent roots from 
the common law discussed in the previous section but also to highlight 
the reasons behind its intellectual sophistication.   
In the 20th century, the civil code in Europe gradually decreased in 
importance and relevance, due in part to the emergence of the regulatory 
and bureaucratic state and the ceding of portions of state sovereignty to 
supranational governing and judicial bodies established by international 
 
 127. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 33. 
 128. Id. at 33-34 
 129. The Code is predicated on three ideological foundations:  private property, freedom of 
contract, and patriarchal family.  See id. at 34-35. 
 130. Id. at 62. 
 131. Id. at 41. 
 132. Id.  For a good outline of the system and organization of the two codes, see MATTEI ET 
AL., supra note 6, at 404-19. 
 133. See GLENDON ET AL., supra note 34, at 42-43.  
 134. The writings of Holmes and Pound are believed to have that influence.  Later on, the 
works of Karl Llewellyn and other jurists who fled Germany to the United States during the 
National Socialist period are considered to have significant influence in mainstream American legal 
thought.  Id. at 43-44. 
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treaties.135  Nonetheless, the fundamental notions of the civilian legal 
tradition, and its peculiar characteristics, which are themselves the 
products of its long history, continue to distinguish it from the common 
law legal tradition.  The fairly common and salient features of the 
civilian system, in particular the distinguishing characteristic of the 
procedures, are discussed below.      
Professor Hazard summarizes the civil law’s procedural system in 
this manner:  
Under the civil law procedural systems, the judge is responsible for 
deciding a case according to the truth of the matter.  The judge decides 
both fact and law because there is no jury or anything like it.  It is 
assumed that the truth of the matter will be revealed by relevant 
evidence.  Under the civil law, it therefore follows that the judge is 
responsible for eliciting relevant evidence.” 136   
With respect to the role of the party litigants, Hazard provides that the 
parties are represented by advocates who assist the parties in presenting 
their case, but that a fundamental difference in the roles of the advocate 
as between the common law and civil law is that, rather than employing 
cunning and trickery to skew the presentation of facts and applicability 
of the law as in the common law, civilian advocates are conceived of as 
assisting the judge in his or her quest for the truth, the fulfillment of the 
judicial responsibility.137  Conceptually,  
the advocates are supposed to provide comment and suggestions to the 
judge, with a deference which varies from one civil law jurisdiction to 
another.  But at least in theory they have no power of initiative after 
they have presented the claims and defenses in the pleadings, except 
with the assent of the judge.138 
This highlights several important assumptions and functions of the 
civil law procedure.  First, the judge is responsible for deciding all 
aspects of the case.  Second, the judge’s only objective and 
responsibility is to find out the truth of the matter in the case before him.  
Third, the judge gets no help from a jury in deciding issues of fact or 
law.  Fourth, the judge is responsible for eliciting all relevant evidence 
from all sources.  Fifth, the advocates’ responsibility is to assist the 
judge in collecting and analyzing the evidence.  Finally, the advocates 
 
 135. See id. at 54. 
 136. See Hazard, supra note 74, at 1019.  
 137. Id. at 1019-20. 
 138. Id. at 1020. 
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can only provide suggestions and comment to the judge, and once the 
process is set in motion by the submission of the claim or defense they 
may not perform any activities without the leave of the court.139  
Although this succinct summary is fairly representative of the most 
common elements of the civil law system, it does not fully capture the 
intricacies within each civil law country and the significant variations 
that exist among the various civil law countries.  Before a comparative 
analysis of the common law and civil law procedures is offered in the 
next section, some intricacies and variations are worth highlighting by 
using the most developed models in Europe, i.e., the French and German 
Codes.   
The French system is perhaps the closest to the above description.  
The French New Code of Civil Procedure enacted in the early 1970s is 
probably the most currently important and relevant.140  Several of its 
characteristics have come to be considered fundamental; two are salient 
to the present discussion.  First, although the judge is responsible for the 
evidence, the parties share that responsibility under the judge’s 
guidance, including the examination of witnesses, the production of 
documents and the commissioning of expert witnesses.141  More 
interestingly, the court is not limited to the application of the law 
identified by the parties.  It may reclassify a case, apply a different 
provision of the law to the developed facts, and arrive at a conclusion.142  
This reinforces the view that the judge is the seeker of the truth and the 
guardian of the law, i.e., an honest broker.143  It must also be noted that 
 
 139. Id. 
 140. See BELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 86. 
 141. Id. at 87.  Technically, the claimant bears the burden of proof; however, the opposing 
party is required to help in adducing evidence.  Id. (citing a decision by the French Court of 
Cassation.  Cour de cassation [Cass.] [supreme court for judicial matters] civ. I, Mar. 20, 2005, No. 
123 (Fr.)). 
 142. See id. at 87-89.  Article 12 of the French Civil Procedure Code states that “[The judge] 
must give or restore the exact classification to the facts transactions [actes] which are the subject of 
the litigation and not stay with the characterization suggested for them by the parties.”  Quoted in id. 
at 88.  Although this seems to be a correct representation of the civil procedure law as it stands 
today, it is important to note that the whole notion of reclassification of case by the judge without 
the parties submission is not entirely without controversy.  Id.  The new Civil Procedure Code 
provides that, where the parties have agreed to keep their legal classification, i.e., if they identify the 
law and ask the court to be governed by that (some sort of choice of law), the court is required to 
apply that law alone not reclassify unless the case affects inalienable rights.  Id. at 89.   
 143. Id.  Note, however, that there is a suggestion in the literature that the involvement of the 
judge may depend on the complexity of the case with more involvement in more complex cases and 
more reliance on the parties’ submissions in less complex cases.  See, e.g., CATHERINE ELLIOTT, 
CATHERINE VERNON & ERIC JEANPIERRE, FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM 179-80 (2d ed. 2006) 
(suggesting that in less complex cases, the judge’s role is more or less like that of the judge in the 
adversarial system). 
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the notion of proof by balance of probabilities, or a preponderance of the 
evidence, is more or less nonexistent.  In the French system, “a fact is 
either proven or not.”144  And second, in each case, a file called the 
dossier is built by the court.145  The dossier contains the claim, the 
defense and all pieces of gathered evidence.146  Each party must have a 
copy of this expansive record.147 
Although principally inquisitorial, the German laws of civil 
procedure seem to contain more elements of adversarial justice than the 
French system.148  The most important civil procedure law in Germany 
is the Code of Civil Procedure, more commonly known as the ZPO.149  
There are several reasons why the ZPO is more just than other 
adversarial systems.  First, in all civil actions before the district court in 
Germany, representation by counsel is mandatory.150  This fact itself 
suggests the level of expectation for counsel involvement.  Stadler neatly 
summarizes the remarkable aspect of the court’s power and the parties’ 
roles:   
The Court has an obligation to prepare the trial.  It has the power to 
demand that the parties elaborate fully on all relevant alleged facts.  
Within the limits inherent in principle of party presentation, the court 
will provide some guidance for the pleadings, and to some extent, will 
even assist a party that failed to present all relevant facts through 
oversight, inadvertence or mistake.151  
The same basic principles underpin criminal and administrative 
procedures in the civil law system.  If anything, the procedures in the 
public law arena demand more active involvement of judges and allow 
less room for manipulation by counsel.  For example, in France, criminal 
proceedings are characterized by judicial investigation of the crime.152  
 
 144. See BELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 87. 
 145. Id. at 90. 
 146. Id. at 90-91. 
 147. Id. at 90. 
 148. See, e.g., HOWARD D. FISHER, THE GERMAN LEGAL SYSTEM & LEGAL LANGUAGE 115 
(2d ed. 1999).  One of the maxims of the German civil procedure is that “it is for the parties to 
proceedings to introduce facts and applications.  The opposite of this principle is the so-called 
‘Inquisitionsprinizp’ (examination maxim or inquisition principle), which applies, for example, in 
criminal and administrative proceeding.” 
 149. INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW 365 (Mathias Reimann & Joachim Zekoll eds., 2d ed. 
2005).  This was most recently amended in 2002.  Id.   
 150. Id. at 367.  Indigent plaintiffs and defendants do have a statutory right to counsel.  Id. 
 151. Id. at 370 (citing ZIVILPROZESSORDNUNG [ZPO] [CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE], Jan. 1, 
2002, § 139). 
 152. See WALTER CAIRNS & ROBERT MCKEON, INTRODUCTION TO FRENCH LAW 173 (1995) 
(citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] arts, 92, 97).  French criminal procedure is governed by the Code of 
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The judge d’instruction is empowered to collect evidence, including by 
conducting searches and seizures, interviewing witnesses, and even 
visiting the crime scene if necessary.153  The judge is required to look at 
not only inculpatory evidence but also exculpatory evidence because the 
mission of the judiciary is principally to find out the truth.154  After the 
judge completes the investigation with the help of the prosecutor and the 
defendant, she will issue a final report identifying the nature of the crime 
and the possible charges that the government may pursue and submits 
the dossier to the office of the procureur de la Republique, who in turn 
forwards it to a panel of three judges who will decide whether 
prosecution is warranted.155  “If they decide there is, then they issue the 
formal charge. . . and transfer the case to the appropriate trial court.”156   
During the actual trial, the judge remains the principal actor, in 
charge of conducting the lines of inquiry and the questions, although the 
opposing parties are involved by suggesting questions they feel may be 
appropriate or beneficial to their case.  As Lerner puts it, “there is a 
direct line of communication between the fact-finders and the 
witness.”157  In fact, the prosecutor and defense council would face 
disciplinary action, even disbarment, if they were ever to attempt to 
contact and interview non-party witnesses, because that is the exclusive 
domain of the judge.158  According to Professor Learner, who served as 
an expert witness in a high profile criminal trial in France, the  
flexible order of the trial allows witness testimony to resemble a 
discussion.  Witnesses can directly respond to the statements of other 
witnesses, in a sort of dialogue.  They are also allowed to speak in their 
natural voices, initially in narrative form.  Neither party has carefully 
coached them before trial, the parties’ direct and cross-examination do 
 
Criminal Procedure of 1808, amended many times since its enactment.  Id. at 169.  The procedure is 
complex, but the entire criminal prosecution and trial process seems to be divided into six distinct 
stages:  reporting of the offense, preliminary investigation by police and referral for judicial 
investigation, judicial investigation of the crime by a judge and issuance of a report recommending 
the institution of a criminal prosecution, the main trial, and enforcement of the outcome.  See id. at 
169-76.  For a good overview of this process, see Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two 
Systems:  An American on Trial for an American Murder in the French Cour D’Assisses, 2001 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 791 (2001). 
 153. See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 152, at 172-74. 
 154. See Lerner, supra note 152, at 802.  
 155. See id. at 801-02. 
 156. See id. at 805-806.  This particular panel is the Chamber de l’instruction.  Id. at 806. 
 157. See id. at 807. 
 158. See id. at 802-03 (citing CODE CIVIL [C. CIV] arts. 101-02).  He also notes that, as the 
prosecutor is not technically a member of the bar, disbarment is not exactly the nature of the 
penalty.  See id. at 803 n.43 (relying on generally JOHN LEUDSDORF, MAN IN HIS ORIGINAL 
DIGNITY:  LEGAL ETHICS IN FRANCE (2001)). 
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not constrain them, and their statements are not interrupted by 
evidentiary objections.  As a result, witnesses are more relaxed and 
often forthcoming with information.”159  
More interestingly, the French system does not strictly impose the 
burden of proof on either of the parties.  As such, the fact finder is asked 
whether she is fully convinced that the alleged act occurred and that the 
defendant is the one who caused it.160  This suggests that, in keeping 
with the inquisitorial tradition, the parties and the judge collaboratively 
establish the facts without allocating any particular burden, which is 
conceptually different from the Anglo-American burden allocation 
system.  To one with an Anglo-American background, it could even be 
difficult to understand.  In any case, the most important aspect of judicial 
investigation and active judicial involvement throughout the process is, 
as Learner puts it, “An indigent defendant is not placed at such a 
disadvantage, having to rely on a poorly funded legal aid system,”161 
including for the gathering and use of exculpatory evidence, as the 
judicial investigator would do that for him.162  
Although German criminal procedure appears to be relatively more 
adversarial than the French system, at least during trial, it is still 
substantially similar.  The German Code of Criminal Procedure of 1879 
(StPO) still governs criminal prosecution in Germany.163  Under the 
StPO, the criminal prosecution process has three distinct phases:  (1) 
investigation by the state attorney’s office, which looks at both 
inculpatory and exculpatory evidence;164 (2) the submission of 
indictment to the appropriate pretrial court, which determines whether 
there is sufficient evidence warranting a trial,165 and if so; (3) the 
commencing of the actual trial.  At trial, in keeping with the inquisitorial 
 
 159. See Lerner, supra note 152, at 853.  He further notes that this system allows the defendant 
to choose to speak in most cases.  Id. 
 160. This might seem like the familiar Anglo-American “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard, 
but Professor Learner suggests that the French version which reads:  “Avez vous une intime 
conviction?” is difficult to translate, but it could mean “Are you deeply, thoroughly convinced?”  
See Lerner, supra note 152, at 800-01. 
 161. Id. at 801 (emphasis added). 
 162. Id. at 805-06.  The judge’s final decision, as well as preliminary rulings throughout the 
investigation, may be appealed to the next level.  The appellate court reviews both questions of law 
and fact, including new facts as appropriate.  See CAIRNS & MCKEON, supra note 152, at 172-74.  
 163. Amended several times since its adoption in 1879, the German Criminal Procedure Code 
(Strafprozessordnung stop) is the principal body of law that governs German Criminal Procedure.  It 
is supplemented with the Judicature Act (Gerichsverfassungsgesetz, or GVG).  See REIMANN & 
ZEKOLL, supra note 149, at 421-22.   
 164. See id. at 423 (citing STPO, §§ 158, 160, 162, 163, 167, and 169). 
 165. See id. (citing STPO, §§ 170, 200).  
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tradition, the judge leads the presentation of evidence and questioning, 
maintaining a prominent and active role.166  As in the French system, 
and depending on the nature and severity of the crime, lay judges 
participate in making the final decision.167  
Notions of official investigation and party passivity also 
characterize administrative proceedings in the civil law system.  In 
France, the rules of administrative procedures are contained in Code de 
Justice Administrative.168  The administrative law system attempts to 
balance two competing interests: the government’s administrative task 
and the protection of citizens from excesses and governmental abuse of 
power.  With this balance in mind, “judges do not rely on the parties to 
provide them with those arguments on which they can rely in coming to 
their decision (‘decisive argument’):  the case is constructed, the facts 
unearthed, and the line of reasoning developed through the work of the 
judge rapporteur during the stage of the instruction.”169  Although legal 
representation is available in most administrative proceedings, according 
to Bell et al., “The lack of representation is unlikely to be damaging to a 
person’s chances of success since . . . the case is literally taken over by 
the court itself from the moment it is introduced.”170 
In addition, administrative proceedings are also characterized by 
the following stages:  (1) the court appoints an officer, called the 
rapporteur, to create a dossier of each case, which contains the 
challenges, the administrative decision, and all the evidence; (2) all 
administrative courts are empowered to seek and obtain relevant 
documents from administrative agencies; (3) the rapporteur then 
produces a note outlining the facts, the evidence, the law, and a draft 
judgment, and then forwards it to the Commissaire du gouvernement, 
which prepares a legal opinion, (4) that leads to trial.171  At trial, the 
rapporteur presents the dossier by outlining the parties’ arguments.  The 
parties are then invited by the administrative court to comment.172  The 
Commissaire du gouvernement then reads their conclusions, concluding 
the public hearing.173  The judges then consider all the arguments and 
evidence in private and reach a decision that must address all points of 
 
 166. See id. at 424-25 (citing STPO §§ 58, 213-225, 243, 244, 258, 260).    
 167. See id. at 425. 
 168. Adopted in May 2000, the Code de justice administrative consolidates all the rules that 
apply in all administrative courts.  See BELL ET AL., supra note 40, at 119 & n.319. 
 169. Id. at 119. 
 170. Id. at 121 (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. at 123-24. 
 172. Id. at 124. 
 173. Id. at 125. 
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contention.174  An appeal will lie either to Cour Administrative d’Appel 
or to the Conseil d’Etat depending on the nature of the appeal.175  The 
appellate tribunals may consider both questions of fact and law.176      
As indicated above, the procedure is essentially inquisitorial in the 
sense that judicial officials are in charge of the investigation of facts and 
the application of law, with only limited help from the parties.  In 
relation to this, the role of the judicial officer charged with developing 
the dossier is captured well in the following passage by French Jurists 
Mossot and Marimbert: “The rapporteur may be faced with applications 
coming from ordinary citizens little versed in rules of law in which the 
subject-matter or legal basis remains concealed rather than being made 
clearly explicit.”177  In these cases, the rapporteur interprets the 
application in a constructive way, not confined to the letter of the appeal, 
but also not contradicting what it says.  This effort to reclassify 
applications is most often made for the benefit of the applicant.178   
Although the French immigration system is characterized by a 
complex set of procedures at different levels, the same fundamental 
notions of administrative law and procedure discussed above underpin 
immigration adjudication, which is decidedly a part of the administrative 
law system.179    
Although German administrative law appears to be more 
complicated because of German federalism,180 administrative 
proceedings are similarly inquisitorial.181  An interesting aspect of this is 
that, even if a party, which may include a government agency, fails to 
cooperate, the adjudicating authority is authorized and required, within 
 
 174. See id. at 125.  
 175. See L. NEVILLE BROWN &JOHN S. BELL, FRENCH ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 115 (1992). 
 176. Id.  It is important to note here that the duality of the French court system—the regular 
courts and the administrative courts—has a long history and that judicial review of administrative 
decisions in the context of the Anglo-American system is unknown.  The French administrative 
system is self contained.  For a good discussion of the position of the administrative courts within 
the French constitutional system of separation of powers, see id. at 8-58.  
 177. Id. at 96-97 (quoting J. MASSOT & J. MARIMBERT, LE CONSEIL D’ETAT 153 (1988). 
 178. Id. 
 179. See Helene Lambert & Janine Silga, Transnational Refugee law in the French Courts:  
Deliberate or Compelled Change in Judicial Attitude?, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW:  
REFUGEE LAW, POLICY, HARMONIZATION AND JUDICIAL DIALOGUE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 37-
41 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Hélène Lambert eds., 2010).  (A detailed discussion of French 
immigration procedures is outside the scope of this paper as its focus is on the techniques of the 
inquisitorial system in general whether it is used in the immigration context or otherwise.)   
 180. For a discussion of the administrative system, see REIMANN & ZEKOLL, supra note 149, at 
87-103.  
 181. See id. at 103-04.  
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reasonable limits, to ascertain the merits of the case ex officio.182  The 
German immigration system is fragmented and complicated because of 
federalism; however, it is a part of the administrative law system sharing 
the same characteristics of the inquisitorial model.183 
C. A Comparative Look at the Inquisitorial and Adversarial 
Advantages 
Comparing the merits and demerits of the adversarial and 
inquisitorial systems outside of a particular context may be difficult to 
put in perspective.  There is also a high risk of over-generalization.  
Instead, understanding the arguments on both sides in a specific context 
is essential in assessing the lessons that one can learn from the other.  
For that reason, before the U.S. immigration deportation proceedings are 
assessed and the inquisitorial model considered in the next part, this 
section examines a set of notable scholarly exchanges in the context of 
civil procedure.184  Evidently, no system can now be said to be entirely 
adversarial or entirely inquisitorial.  However, some basic differences 
among each system do exist.  In 1985, Professor John Langbein, the 
preeminent comparatist, published his most provocative article, titled 
“The German Advantage in Civil Procedure.”185  This article attracted 
immense attention and many written responses by prominent scholars.  
Some questioned the accuracy of the claims while others challenged the 
underlying assumptions.  The two most thoughtful reactions were “The 
American Advantage:  The Value of Inefficient Litigation” by Professor 
Samuel Gross,186 and “The German Advantage in Civil Procedure:  A 
Plea for More Details and Fewer Generalities in Comparative 
 
 182. See id. at 105 (citing § 24 of the German Federal Administrative Act, called 
Untersuchungsgrundsatz (or “VwVfG”)). 
 183. See Paul Tiedemann, The Use of Foreign Asylum Jurisprudence in the German 
Administrative Courts, in THE LIMITS OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW, supra note 179, at 57-62.  
 184. Although comparing the immigration adjudication systems in the inquisitorial and 
adversarial legal traditions might seem more relevant, the basic inquisitorial and adversarial 
approaches share the same basic characteristics across specific areas of law.  Because the focus here 
is on the system of adjudication in general rather than the specific area, the debate in the civil 
procedure context is equally instructive.  It is chosen because it fully captures the merits and 
demerits of each system of adjudication.  Moreover, the purpose of this article is not to provide a 
comparative study of immigration adjudication systems.  Its purpose is limited to showing how the 
inquisitorial model might be a desirable technique regardless of how it is employed in the 
immigration context in civil law countries.  This article does not endorse any particular immigration 
adjudication model.  It merely purports to show the advantages of using the basic inquisitorial 
model in U.S. deportation proceedings.            
 185. Langbein, supra note 31. 
 186. Gross, supra note 31, at 734. 
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Scholarship” by Professor Ronald Allen and others.187  The discussions 
in these articles brilliantly capture the perceived advantages and 
disadvantages of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems in the context 
of civil procedure with some reference to criminal procedure.  Quite 
interestingly, the discussions which began in the context of civil 
procedure quickly became adversarial advocacies for one or the other 
system, making them excellent additions to the literature in this area.  
The following discussion draws on these sources in evaluating the 
advantages of the adversarial and inquisitorial systems, setting the stage 
for the evaluation of the U.S. system for detention and deportation of 
non-citizens and the recommendation in the next section for the adoption 
of the inquisitorial model.  
Langbein boldly asserts that the German inquisitorial system is 
fundamentally superior to that of the U.S. adversarial system.  His 
arguments are very instructive and are examined as follows:  
1. The adversarial system provides incentives for the distortion of 
evidence because the system relegates the gathering and 
presentation of evidence to partisans who choose evidence that 
is supportive only of their respective positions.  He notes that the 
parties necessarily engage in “truth-defeating distortions.”188  
The inquisitorial system, on the other hand, relies on judicial 
fact-gathering, which means that a neutral official gathers all the 
evidence with a view to finding out the truth, not prevailing 
against an adversary.189   
2. Judicial control of the evidence gathering and analysis brings 
efficiency and fairness because:  (a) it eliminates the bifurcation 
of the processes into the plaintiff’s case and the defendant’s 
case, as the entire inquiry is focused on finding out what really 
happened; and (b) if the judicial inquiry finds that there is a 
sufficient defense, no time or resources are wasted by 
proceeding with the plaintiff’s case, which means greater 
efficiency.190 
3. Unlike the common law system, the culminating event called 
“the trial” does not have the same meaning as a dramatic show 
 
 187. Allen et al., supra note 31. 
 188. See Langbein, supra note 31, at 823, 825. 
 189. Id. at 824.  
 190. See id. at 830.  One example that he provides relates to a contract dispute.  If the judge 
finds out that the contract is vitiated by illegality, she would require the plaintiff to go through 
providing evidence as to the formation of the contract etc., she would just focus on the illegality and 
dispose of the case on that ground alone.  Id. 
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where the parties are the sparring opponents and the judge the 
passive umpire.191  The inquisitorial method “lessens tension 
and theatrics, and it encourages settlement.”  Moreover, “[w]hen 
the court inquires and directs, it sets no stage for advocates to 
perform.  The forensic skills of counsel can wrest no material 
advantage,” which potentially equalizes the haves and the have-
nots.192   
4. Witness preparation or coaching in the adversarial system is a 
guarantee for distortion because “it is the rare case in which 
either side yearns to have the witnesses, or anyone, give the 
whole truth.”193  
5. The assumption that cross-examination is the best tool to 
eliciting the truth and correcting the bias of a prepared witness is 
fundamentally flawed because it is “too often ineffective to undo 
the consequences of skillful coaching[][and] . . . allows so much 
latitude for bullying and other truth-defeating stratagems [that] it 
is frequently the source of fresh distortion when brought to bear 
against truthful testimony.”194   
6. Partisan-hired and presented expert witnesses are even worse 
because they have perverse incentives.195  “If the experts do not 
 
 191. See BELL, supra note 40, at 85 (“There is no ‘trial’ in the common law sense in French 
civil procedure.”) (quoting J. Beardsley, Proof of Fact in French Civil Procedure, 34 AM, J. COMP. 
L. 459, 480 (1986)); see also Astrid Standler & Wolfgang Hau, The Law of Civil Procedure, in 
INTRODUCTION TO GERMAN LAW, supra note 149, at 369-70 (“Under German law, the distinction 
between the trial and pretrial phase of litigation is less sharp than in common law countries.  It has 
even been said that conducting a lawsuit in a civil law system such as Germany consists rather of 
piecemeal litigation characterized by the predominance of written elements and that there is nothing 
that could be properly called a trial.”) (citing Hein Kotz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the 
U.S., 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 61, 72 (2003)).  
 192. Langbein, supra note 31, at 831.  To this point, he adds the possibility of witness surprise 
and trickery in cross-examination, etc. 
 193. Id. at 833 (quoting Frankel, supra note 38, at 1038) (emphasis in original).  Langbein adds 
that, “If we had deliberately set out to find a means of impairing the reliability of witness testimony, 
we could not have done much better than the existing system of having partisans prepare witnesses 
in advance of trial and examine and cross-examine them at trial.”  Id. 
 194. Id.  Langbein acknowledges Wigmore’s famous saying that cross-examination is “the best 
legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” citing 5 JOHN H. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 29 (3d 
ed. 1940), but counters it by quoting Judge Frankel who said, “The litigator’s devices, let’s be clear, 
have utility in testing dishonest witnesses, ferreting out falsehood, and thus exposing the truth.  But 
to a considerable degree these devices are like other potent weapons, equally lethal for heroes and 
villains.”  Id. at 833 n.31 (quoting Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039).  
 195. Id. at 835.  
At the American trial bar, those of us who serve as expert witnesses are known as 
“saxophones.”  This is a revealing term, as slang often is.  The idea is that the lawyer 
plays the tune, manipulating the expert as though the expert were a musical instrument 
on which the lawyer sounds the desired notes . . . Nobody wants to disappoint a patron; 
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cancel each other out, the advantage is likely to be with the 
expert whose forensic skills are the more enticing.”196 
7. Perhaps Langbein’s most interesting point relates to what he 
calls in German “Waffenungleichheit” or, as he quite literally 
puts it, “inequality of weapons, or in this instance, inequality of 
counsel.”  He notes that “in a fair fight the pugilists must be well 
matched.”197  He gives it context when he notes “you cannot 
send me into a ring with Mohammed Ali if you expect a fair 
fight.”198  Langbein’s main point is that “very little in our 
adversary system is designed to match the combatants of 
comparable prowess, even though adversarial prowess is a main 
factor affecting the outcome of litigation.”199 
8. Langbein also addresses the three most fundamental criticisms 
of the inquisitorial system corresponding with the advantages of 
the adversarial system:  (a) premature judgment, or the 
possibility that the investigating judge may arrive at a 
conclusion before she has had the opportunity to see all the 
evidence.200  In response, Langbein says that, although the 
advocates in the inquisitorial system are not as active as those in 
the adversarial system, they help the judge’s investigation by 
representing their client’s views and direct the judge to evidence 
that helps them.201  He does not see any advantages in keeping 
the judge deliberately ignorant until the day of the trial.202  In 
any case, he suggests that the propensity for making a premature 
judgment depends on judicial temperament and experience, 
which could be remedied through careful recruitment and proper 
training.203  (b) Individual autonomy.  Langbein notes that the 
celebration of the adversarial system comes from the criminal 
process, which rests on some very basic foundations:  the 
presumption of innocence, the privilege against self-
incrimination, and requiring proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
 
and beyond this psychological pressure is the financial inducement.  
Id.   
 196. Id. at 836. 
 197. Id. at 843.  
 198. Id.  
 199. Id.  The rest of the paragraph reads:  “Adversary theory thus presupposes a condition that 
adversary practice achieves only indifferently.”  Id.  
 200. Id. at 843-44. 
 201. Id. at 844. 
 202. Id. at 848. 
 203. See id. at 848-51. 
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doubt.204  In other words, the adversarial system protects the 
accused person’s right to gather his own evidence and present it 
in any way he wishes, rather than relegating that duty to a 
judicial officer.  Lacking a strong argument against this, 
Langbein brushes it aside by saying that although he does not 
see the merits of a system that deliberately attempts to err on one 
side; albeit understandable in the criminal context, he argues that 
in any case none of this affects his argument in the civil 
context.205  (c) Bureaucratic inefficacy and abuse.  The career 
judiciary is a large bureaucracy, prone to misuse of judicial 
power.206  And yet Langbein argues that proper recruitment and 
retention evaluations coupled with the right incentives and 
appellate control could meaningfully deter and correct potential 
abuses.  He cites the rarity of complaints about the German 
judiciary as a case in point.207    
One of the first responders to Langbein’s arguments was Professor 
Samuel Gross.  In his article, “The American Advantage,” Gross reduces 
Langbein’s claim of the German-style inquisitorial advantage to 
efficiency,208 accepts the proposition as true,209 but argues that 
efficiency is not necessarily a virtue.210  Ironically, in praising American 
inefficiency, Gross demonstrates the kind of skillful adversarial 
advocacy with which Langbein was concerned.  Gross defends 
inefficiency and he does it well.  The key points of his argument are:   
1. Accuracy:  The measure of a system is not speed or efficiency, 
but accuracy.  Langbein provides no evidence that German 
inquisitorial outcomes are more accurate.211  Gross cites a study 
which concludes that “adversary presentation of argument was 
more likely than non-adversarial argument to counteract a bias 
 
 204. Id. at 842 & n.68 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (noting that 
“the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice” is “the fundamental purpose of the 
Fifth Amendment.”)). 
 205. See id. at 842-43. 
 206. See id. at 853-55. 
 207. See id. at 854-57. 
 208. See Gross, supra note 31, at 734 (“Roughly, Professor Langbein argues that by 
comparison to the German process, American litigation is overly complex, expensive, slow, and 
unpredictable—in short, inefficient.”) 
 209. Id.  (“Professor Langbein is also quite convincing; some may disagree but I, for one, have 
no basis to dispute his claims, and no impulse to try.”) 
 210. Id. (“The point of this paper is different: to question the assumption that efficiency in 
adjudication is a virtue.”) 
 211. Id. at 740. 
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about the outcome that was deliberately implanted in judges.”212  
He eventually discounts it, however, convinced that it is 
impossible to control the experimental environment.213  He 
eventually concludes that the comparison of accuracy between 
the German and American systems is not possible to measure.214  
However, he notes that consistency might be a proxy to measure 
accuracy.215  That means any deviation from the mode might be 
considered inaccurate.216  But even by that measure, Gross is not 
able to say that the adversarial system is better.217  That leaves 
him to discuss the role and importance of the jury in arriving at a 
more accurate result in criminal cases.218  For that, he has good 
evidence in his favor.  According to a study that he calls solid, 
“trial judges thought the defendant should be acquitted only half 
as often as the juries did.”219  He recognizes, however, that what 
the study compares is variations within the same system, i.e., 
judge versus jury in the adversarial system, and he recognizes 
that it is possible that the use of juries in criminal trials in the 
inquisitorial system may contain the same guarantee of 
minimizing wrongful convictions.220   
2. Intrinsic value:  by this term, Gross means the political and 
cultural arguments in favor of the adversarial system.221  
Characteristics of this are distrust of government and respect for 
individual autonomy.222  The system protects these values 
through the use of juries and a provision of representation for 
the accused in criminal trials.223  Related to this, people are 
more likely to accept a system that gives them autonomy, and 
Gross notes that the system has “symbolic and ceremonial 
 
 212. See id. at 740 & n.22 (citing JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, 
A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 41-53 (1975)). 
 213. For example, the study used college students and first-year law students, which means that 
it did not account for the experiences of judges.  See id. at 740 n.22. 
 214. Id. at 741.  
 215. Id. at 741-42. 
 216. Id.  
 217. See id.  In fact, he comes to the opposite conclusion:  “if the mode defines truth, then the 
variance is error, and the German system has less of it.”  Id. at 742. 
 218. Id. at 743-44. 
 219. See id. at 744 (citing HARRY KALVEN, JR. & HANS ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 58 
(1966)).  This study analyzed 3,500 jury trials.  Id.  
 220. Id. at 744.  
 221. Id. at 744-45. 
 222. Id. at 745. 
 223. Id. at 744-46.  
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importance” as it gives the “appearance of justice.”224  He 
concludes these points by saying:  “But comparisons are 
difficult because, on the whole, the cathartic impact of legal 
ceremonies is culturally bound and culturally determined.225  In 
law as in religion, the ceremonies that affect us most are usually 
those that are most familiar.”226 
3. Having summarized the comparative advantages and 
disadvantages under the above two headings and having 
concluded that neither accuracy nor intrinsic value conclusively 
support a claim of adversarial superiority, Gross goes on to 
present his most important argument, i.e., that inefficiency may 
be beneficial and desirable for several reasons.  First, efficiency 
is a product of specialization, which is necessarily complex.227  
If it is complex, it is harder to set up and almost impossible to 
fix if it fails.228  To support this point, he notes that “unless you 
can operate a word processor or a computer reliably, a 
typewriter will serve you better.”229  Second, homogeneity 
makes the operation of a complex and efficient judicial 
bureaucracy easier, while American diversity and its fragmented 
political system make that kind of system almost impossible to 
set up and successfully manage.230  He concedes that the 
adversarial system produces inefficient and uneven justice, but 
he asks “[c]ould a switch make matters worse?”  Answering that 
question in the affirmative, he goes on stating: “a bad civil-law 
system would be worse than anything the common law can 
produce.  Incompetent or dishonest judges and investigating 
prosecutors would be slower, less consistent, and less accurate 
than any cast of private advocates and lay jurors, and entrenched 
bureaucracies are notoriously hard to displace.”231  This being 
Gross’ main and perhaps most convincing argument, he goes on 
offering more reasons why an inefficient system is better. 
 
 224. Id. at 745-47.  
 225. Id. at 747. 
 226. Id.  
 227. Id. at 748. 
 228. See id. at 749-50.  He emphasizes that when it does not work, it really does not work.  As 
an example, he quotes an Italian jurist as saying: “The Italian legal system is like the German, 
except that it does not work.”  Id. at 750.  
 229. See id. at 749.  
 230. See id. at 750-51.  
 231. Id. at 751.   
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4. Deterrence of litigation:  Simply stated, Gross’ position is that if 
the system is inefficient, people don’t use it—that reduces 
caseload, which means less litigation and less resource 
burden.232  That is one reason why the great majority of cases 
settle outside of court in America.233  However, he does not 
convincingly explain away the fact that such a system would 
favor the more powerful party.  This leads to his next point.234 
5. Creation of the “zone of immunity”:  By this he means that if all 
draconian laws that we have enacted are enforced with great 
efficiency, which could mean a violation ticket for driving 66 
miles per hour in a 65 zone, it could impinge upon individual 
autonomy and privacy in ways that are not familiar to us.235   
6. Virtues of informal interactions and settlements:  These kinds of 
informal private settlements produce rules that are difficult to 
write in the form of legislation due to “their relative flexibility, 
and their responsiveness to interests that legal systems are hard 
pressed to regulate—trust, reputation, civility, etc.”236  But then, 
it is important to maintain an inefficient “coercive option . . . 
that is rarely used . . . to keep the normative system intact.”237   
For all of these reasons, Gross prefers an inefficient adversarial 
system over an efficient inquisitorial system.  Most notable and most 
relevant for purposes of this article is that our democracy cannot avoid 
making draconian laws and we are better off without efficient 
enforcement of these laws.238  Although it may be a very odd way of 
seeking immunity in a democratic system, the reality in the immigration 
context may support Gross’ assertion.239  But this also means that the 
good laws are not enforced efficiently, and that the less powerful are 
likely to lose in a system of self-help.  Apart from this, a closer reading 
of Gross’ article suggests that in fact, he agrees with all of Langbein’s 
assertions about the superiority of the inquisitorial system, but he thinks 
that we are culturally incapable of setting up a German-type efficient 
system and that we like our system just fine and believe that inefficiency 
serves us well.   
 
 232. Id. at 752-53. 
 233. Id. at 752.  
 234. See id. at 752-54. 
 235. Id. at 753.  
 236. Id. at 756.  
 237. Id. 
 238. Id. at 755. 
 239. Id. 
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Allen et al. admit that if what Langbein says about the German 
system is true, it is a superior system.240  However, they doubt the 
accuracy of the characterization, hence the title of their article, “A Plea 
for more details . . . .”241  They address each of the important points that 
Langbein makes and express doubts about their accuracy.242  Most 
interestingly, the preoccupation of the article is not to challenge the 
claim of superiority of the inquisitorial system as a system of 
adjudication, but rather to challenge the claim that the system as 
implemented in Germany is superior.243  They focus mostly on three 
aspects of Langbein’s claims:  the procedures, the use of experts and the 
qualifications and incentives of judges.    
1. The procedures:  At the level of efficiency, Allen et al. note that 
more than 90 percent of cases in America settle outside of court 
or through dismissal.244  Langbein’s claim of the excesses of 
cross-examination and surprise of witnesses are exaggerated, 
they argue, because the evidentiary rules restrict the perceived 
excesses.245  Langbein’s claim about witness-coaching is 
considered speculative and lacking in supporting data.246  In 
simple terms, they ask why we should believe Langbein when 
he says that Wigmore’s assertion, that cross-examination is “the 
greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth,” is 
“nothing more than an article of faith.”247 
2. Experts:  Citing some studies, Allen et al. note that experts 
cannot be categorically classified and that their professional 
ethics are more important than the incentives the system 
provides.248  On the other hand, there is no guarantee that court-
paid experts do not experience the same kind of pressure and 
incentives as party-hired ones.  If that is not the case, Langbein 
 
 240. See Allen et al., supra note 31, at 706. (“Professor Langbein provides his instruction on 
methods of improving the administration of civil justice at a high level of generality.  If the 
generalities that he invokes are true, then he has made a powerful argument that the American 
system is decidedly inferior to the German system in certain important respects and we would do 
well to embrace aspects of that system.  If the generalities are false, Professor Langbein’s article 
reduces to the mere articulation of a preference for the German system with no supporting 
rationale.”). 
 241. See id. at 707.  
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. at 708. 
 244. Id. at 711.  
 245. Id. at 717-18. 
 246. Id. at 718-19.  
 247. Id. at 720. (quoting WIGMORE, supra note 194, at 29). 
 248. Id. at 737. 
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provides no evidence.  To the contrary, German experts are 
often known as “secret judges.”249 
3. The recruitment and training of judges:  “[The] judicial career 
attracts persons ‘who feel in a particular way bound to the 
traditional norms and structures of society and want to protect 
them from change.’”250  Citing to some supporting data, they 
suggest that after all is said and done, judicial recruitment and 
training in Germany is not as glamorous or as self-contented as 
Langbein suggests.251   
Allen’s main point, as indicated above, is that the German system is 
not superior.  The article does nothing to discredit the inquisitorial 
system, if indeed it is set up the way Langbein says it is.  Neither Allen 
nor Gross find fault inherent in the inquisitorial system.  Most 
interestingly, they focus on issues that are, at best, tangential to 
Langbein’s argument, but their immediate and decidedly vigorous and 
negative reaction, along with the content of their writing, tells a more 
important and coherent story:  what sustains the adversarial system is 
tradition rather than common sense and reason.  This assertion is more 
accurate when it comes to adversarial deportation proceedings, which 
will be the subject of the next section.      
III.  THE ADVERSARIAL DISADVANTAGE IN DEPORTATION 
PROCEEDINGS 
A few years ago, two of this writer’s students represented an 
asylum-seeker from a troubled African country facing removal 
proceedings in the United States.252  When we first interviewed the 
client in a detention facility, he told us that friends of his mailed him a 
package from France, where he had stayed for a while before attempting 
to enter Canada via the United States.  He said that the Immigration and 
Customs Enforcement (ICE) gave him the package, which had been 
opened and apparently inspected.  We asked ICE if there were any 
documents that they took out of the package.  ICE told us to submit a 
FOIA request to receive an answer.  Recognizing that a FOIA request 
would entail several additional months of detention for our client, we 
 
 249. See id. at 738.  
 250. See id. at 746 (quoting WOLFGANG KAUPEN, DIE HÜTER VON RECHT UND ORDNUNG 192-
93 (1969)). 
 251. See id. at 746-61.  
 252. The names of the client, the students, the Government’s counsel and the location of the 
trial are withheld, and on file with the author.  (All of the information, including the names and 
addresses of the students, who are now practicing attorneys, can be provided upon request). 
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went back to the client, explained the circumstances to him, and asked 
him if there might have been anything in the package that he would 
think could be either helpful or damaging to his asylum claim.  The 
client positively assured us that it was impossible that they could find 
any evidence in that package that could undermine his asylum claim.  
Confident about the assurance, the students prepared the claim and the 
court scheduled it for an individual hearing, which in removal 
proceedings, is the actual trial.   
On the day of the trial, the two very young third year law students, 
who had never had any kind of trial experience before, took their seats 
next to the Assistant Chief Counsel representing the United State 
Government.  Unfortunately for them, the government’s counsel 
happened to be a very experienced, excellent litigator whose skills are 
only surpassed by his zeal.  The judge appeared by video and the court 
was called to order.  As the written record had already been developed, 
the judge asked the student-attorneys to present witness testimony.  They 
conducted examination-in-chief of their client and elicited all the 
relevant information.  He consistently and credibly testified about the 
persecution that he had endured in his home country.  At the time, it was 
uncontested that in that country, about a thousand people were being 
killed every day.  The examination-in-chief took about 45 minutes, after 
which the judge gave the Government’s counsel the opportunity to 
cross-examine our client.  After nearly three hours of cross-examination, 
which touched upon all aspects of the initial testimony and more, the 
Government’s counsel began its final line of questions.  They are 
reproduced from memory as follows:  
1. Government: When you left your country, were you in 
possession of a passport issued by your home government?   
Client: No.                
2. Government: When you left your country, did you have any 
other kind of official document issued by your home 
government?  
Client: Only my driver’s license.  
3. Government:  Let me ask you again:  Did you have a passport 
with you when you left your country.   
Client: No.  
4. Government: I’ll give you a final chance: have you ever had a 
passport issued to you by your home government at any time?   
Client:  I already said no, and the answer to that question is 
again no, I have never had a passport issued under my name by 
my home government.  
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At that point, the Government’s counsel pulled a passport-looking 
document out of his briefcase and asked the judge’s permission to 
approach the witness and show it to him.  We obviously vigorously 
objected on many grounds, including unfair surprise, evidence obtained 
through an egregious violation of the Fourth Amendment, and violation 
of due process in general.  At that point, we disclosed to the judge our 
suspicion that the Government obtained that document unlawfully from 
the package that was mailed to our client.  Faced with a serious 
dilemma, the judge came up with a clever compromise:  he excluded the 
admissibility of the evidence but allowed the use of the evidence for 
impeachment purposes.  When the sole source of the evidence is 
essentially the witness’s statement, its impeachment necessarily meant 
loss or removal where our client was concerned.  Seeing the trial lost by 
this underhanded tactic, in the face of a witness whose testimony was so 
convincing and so compelling and so consistent with all objective 
evidence of the country’s conditions, including the State Department’s 
own report, seemed to be devastating to everyone involved, except 
perhaps the Government’s Counsel.  Finally, after we were given the 
opportunity to inspect the document first, the government’s counsel 
approached the witness, confronted him with the document and asked, 
“Isn’t this a passport issued to you by your home government?”  To 
everybody’s surprise, the witness said “No, this is the driver’s license 
that I told you about.”  Fortunately for the client and his counsels, that 
document was indeed a driver’s license that only looked like a passport.  
The confusion was exacerbated because the text was in French and the 
Government’s counsel had never had it translated.  That Perry Mason 
exchange concluded the four-hour ordeal and the judge granted asylum 
without hesitation.     
What if that document was a passport as the government’s counsel 
believed and the client had said “Yes, and sorry, but I did not think you 
had it.”  Without a doubt, that would have destroyed his credibility and 
hence, his asylum claim.  It would have been a dramatic win for the 
government, although there would have been no way to know why the 
client felt that he had to conceal his passport.  It is possible that he might 
be hiding something of no consequence at all, but it would have been 
enough to destroy his credibility and his chances for a successful asylum 
application.  The kind of tactic that the Government’s counsel employed 
is a classic adversarial tool.  To make matters worse for the non-citizen, 
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the Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply in deportation 
proceedings.253  
This section looks at the relevant sources of rules that make this 
kind of unnecessary confrontation possible.  It examines the perceived 
roles of the judge, the government’s counsel, the respondent, and the 
respondent’s counsel under existing rules and custom.                    
A. The Nature of Deportation Proceedings under the INA and 
Regulations  
At its formation, the polity of the United States was predicated on 
the notions of “limited government, negative freedom, and laissez-faire 
economics,” and did not envision the government’s role to be anything 
more than the protection of life, liberty, and property.254  As society 
grew in size and complexity, the original three branches of government 
became incapable of handling the increasing complexity.  This led to the 
creation of the “fourth branch of government,” or the administrative 
state.255  The administrative system was given a broad delegation of 
power to perform the government’s complex tasks in a more efficient 
and expedited manner than the formal legislative and judicial process 
could possibly perform.256  The tasks of the administrative system 
include rulemaking and adjudication, which could be formal adversarial 
adjudication. 257   
 
 253. See generally Won Kidane, Revisiting the Rules of Procedure and Evidence Applicable in 
Adversarial Administrative Deportation Proceedings:  Lessons from the Department of Labor Rules 
of Evidence, 57  CATH. U. L. REV. 93 (2008) (In that article, I argued that the lack of formal rules of 
evidence might be one of the reasons that make this kind of irregularity and unfairness possible.  I 
still maintain that position in lieu of the more fundamental change that this article proposes). 
 254. See STEVEN J. CANN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 9 (4th ed. 2006). 
 255. See Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470, 487 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (using the “fourth branch” for the first time, stating that the rise of the administrative 
state is the most significant legal development of the last century).  For a good discussion of the 
place of administrative agencies within the constitutional framework, see generally Peter L. Strauss, 
The Place of Agencies in Government:  Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 573 (1984).  Administrative rules enacted by the First Congress related only to customs and 
veterans’ benefits.  Before the Civil War, around eleven administrative agencies existed, which 
included the Internal Revenue Service and the Patent Office.  By 1941, that number had grown to 
fifty-one.  See William H. Kuehnle, Standards of Evidence in Administrative Proceedings, 49 
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 829, 836 (2004-2005). 
 256. Such delegation has never been without controversy.  See, e.g., Ruberoid, 343 U.S. at 487-
89 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“Administrative Agencies have been called quasi-legislative . . .”). 
 257. See Michael H. Graham, Application of the Rules of Evidence in Administrative Agency 
Formal Adversarial Adjudication:  A New Approach, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 353, 353.  For a 
comprehensive treatment of the functions of Administrative agencies, see generally WILLIAM F. 
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The delegation of the judicial function of adjudicating cases and 
controversies to executive administrative agencies has always faced a 
serious doctrinal and procedural dilemma.  For example, in the 1930s, 
the American Bar Association noted that “The judicial branch of the 
federal government is being rapidly and seriously undermined . . . . [S]o 
far as possible, the decision of controversies of a judicial character must 
be brought back into the judicial system.”258  The choice then became 
between bringing the resolution of controversies back to the court 
system and bringing court rules to the administrative system.  As the 
benefits of administrative adjudication had become so well-recognized 
by then, “[t]he effort later turned from bringing administrative 
proceedings into a federal court system to bringing court standards into 
the administrative proceedings.”259   
By enacting the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) in 1946, 
Congress attempted to strike a reasonable compromise between formal 
judicial rules and informal administrative procedures.260  For example, 
the APA states:  
Any oral or documentary evidence may be received, but the agency as 
a matter of policy shall provide for the exclusion of irrelevant, 
immaterial, or unduly repetitious evidence.  A sanction may not be 
imposed or rule or order issued except on consideration of the whole 
record or those parts of thereof cited by a party and supported by and 
in accordance with reliable, probative, and substantial evidence.261   
Although the numerosity of adjudicative administrative agencies does 
not allow for a singular conclusion, some are apparently more 
adversarial than others.  In fact, it is suggested that administrative 
proceedings resemble federal non-jury trials in all aspects.262  According 
to the Supreme Court, “the role of the modern . . . administrative law 
judge . . . [is] functionally comparable to that of a judge.”263  Although 
 
FUNK, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO & RUSSELL L. WEAVER, ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND PRACTICE 
5, 32-47 (4th ed. 2010).    
 258. See 1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 1.4, at 12 (4th ed. 2002) 
(quoting 59 A.B.A.R. 539, 549 (1934)). 
 259. See Kuehnle, supra note 255, at 843-44. 
 260. See Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended in 5 U.S.C.). 
 261. APA § 7(c); 5 U.S.C. § 556(d) (2000).   
 262. See Elliot B. Glicksman, The Modern Hearsay Rule Should Find Administrative Law 
Application, 78 NEB. L. REV. 135, 144 (1999).  According to the Supreme Court, a “fundamental . . 
. purpose [of the APA was] to curtail and change the practice of embodying in one person or agency 
the duties of prosecutor and judge.”  See Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 41 (1950). 
 263. See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 513 (1978) (quotations omitted). 
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doctrinally a part of this legacy, deportation proceedings are subject to 
their own exclusive rules of procedure under the INA and related 
regulations.264  The following subsections briefly discuss the nature of 
adversarial deportation proceedings from the perspective of the actors 
and highlight the shortcomings.     
B. The Role of the Government’s Counsel (ICE)  
The enduring debate about whether the government’s lawyer 
represents the interests of the particular agency that hires her, or those of 
the president, or even those of the public in general, seems to have no 
reasonable resolution.265  However, perhaps the most important source 
of federal law that provides guidance on the issue of the role of the 
government’s lawyer is the Citizens’ Protection Act of 1998.266  That 
Act provides that Department of Justice lawyers, which include ICE 
counsel, are subject to “State laws and rules and local Federal court rules 
governing attorneys in each State where such attorney engages in that 
 
 264. See INA § 240(a)(3) (“Unless otherwise specified in this chapter, a proceeding under this 
section shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for determining whether an alien may be admitted 
to the United States or . . . removed.”).  See also 8 C.F.R. § 240 (2007) (providing the details of the 
procedures).  It is important to note, however, that although these rules are similar to the APA rules, 
the APA rules themselves are not directly applicable in immigration proceedings.  This is so 
because of a set of Supreme Court decisions that were rendered beginning in 1950.  The first of 
these was Wong Yang Sung, 339 U.S. 33 (1950).  In that case, the Supreme Court held that the APA 
was applicable in immigration proceedings.  Id. at 33, 51, 53.  This decision was rendered two years 
before the adoption of the most comprehensive immigration law, i.e., the INA, in 1952.  A few 
years later, in Marcello v. Bonds, the Supreme Court held that the INA is the only source of rules 
for immigration adjudication and as such the APA did not apply.  See Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 
302, 309-10 (1955) (“[W]e cannot ignore the background of the 1952 immigration legislation, its 
laborious adaptation of the Administrative Procedure Act to the deportation process, the specific 
points at which deviation from the Administrative Procedure Act were made, the recognition in the 
legislative history of this adaptive techniques and of the particular deviations, and the direction in 
the statute that the methods therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for 
deportation proceedings.”).  The Supreme Court reaffirmed this decision ten years later in Ardestani 
v. INS, 502 U.S. 129, 133-34 (1991) (stating that the INA is the sole and exclusive source of 
procedural rules in deportation proceedings). 
 265. See, e.g., FUNK ET AL., supra note 257, at 32-47.  For example, a Report by the District of 
Columbia Bar Special Committee on Government Lawyers and the Model Rules of Professional 
Conduct has concluded that because the “public interest” and even “the government” are amorphous 
concepts, the responsibility of the government’s lawyer is to the agency that she works for.  
Excerpts of the Report are reproduced in id. at 35-37 (“This analysis inevitably led to the conclusion 
that the employing agency should normally be regarded as the client of the government lawyer.  In 
most cases, the employing agency will be a discrete entity, clearly definable and the source of 
identifiable lines of authority.  The lawyer’s duties typically will be directed by the head of the 
agency or his delegate; the lawyer’s explicit responsibility will be limited to those assigned by the 
agency; and agency regulations provide a clear benchmark of assessing attorney conduct.”). 
 266. Codified at 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a) (1998). 
46
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/5
11- KIDANE_MACRO.DOCM 7/16/2012  11:04 AM 
2012] THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE 693 
attorney’s duties, to the same extent and in the same manner as other 
attorneys in that State.”267  Accordingly, the important subsidiary 
sources include state, federal, and local rules of professional conduct.  
Although there are variations at the state level, the ABA Model Rules 
may be taken as an example.  At the federal level, most agencies do have 
their own disciplinary rules, which include Immigration Regulations.268  
These sources are discussed as follows.  
Under the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which are 
adopted by many states, a lawyer must represent her client with 
appropriate competence,269 diligence, and zeal.270  The rules require 
organization lawyers, which include government lawyers, to act in the 
best interest of the organization.271  They may make any and all non-
frivolous claims to advance their client’s interest.272  Prosecutors in 
criminal cases are subject to additional rules, which require them to 
uphold the rule of law while maintaining their prosecutorial zeal.273  
Zealous advocacy can take many different forms.  An often cited 
example in recent years is John Yoo’s “torture memo,” which advised 
President Bush that U.S. law banned extreme acts only, which 
essentially justified acts such as water boarding.274  Though the 
government later withdrew it as lacking “care and sobriety,”275 some 
observers even characterized it as “standard lawyerly fare, routine 
stuff.”276  There is no denying that wherever the mindset is adversarial, 
 
 267. 28 U.S.C. § 530B(a).  
 268. See infra notes 269-84 and accompanying text. 
 269. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 (2011) (“A lawyer shall provide competent 
representation to a client.  Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation.”). 
 270. See id. R. 1.3 (“A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness in 
representing a client.”). 
 271. See id. R. 1.13. 
 272. See id. R. 3.1 (“A lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or assert or controvert an 
issue therein, unless there is a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes 
a good faith argument for an extension, modification or reversal of existing law.  A lawyer for the 
defendant in a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a proceeding that could result in 
incarceration, may nevertheless so defend the proceeding as to require that every element of the 
case be established.”)  The comment to this rule states:  “The filing of an action or defense or 
similar action taken for a client is not frivolous merely because the facts have not first been fully 
substantiated or because the lawyer expects to develop vital evidence only by discovery.”  Id. R. 3.1 
cmt. 
 273. See id. R. 3.8.  
 274. See FUNK ET AL., supra note 257, at 32.  
 275. Id. (citing JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY:  LAW AND JUDGMENT IN THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 146, 148, 150, 151 (2007)).  
 276. Id. at 43 (quoting Eric Posner & Adrian Vermeule, A “Torture” Memo and its Tortuous 
Critics, WALL ST. J., Jul. 6, 2004, at A.22 (Eastern edition)). 
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this might seem “routine stuff” for lawyers, whether they are private or 
government lawyers. 
There are now elaborate disciplinary rules regulating “immigration 
practitioners.”277  The ethical responsibilities imposed by these rules are 
more stringent than the ordinary rules of professional conduct.278  While 
the rules against advancing frivolous claims or defenses apply to all 
attorneys appearing before an immigration judge,279 some of the more 
stringent rules on discipline do not apply to the government’s 
lawyers,280 who are supposedly subject to separate Department of 
Justice disciplinary procedures, which the regulations do reference.281  
The referenced provision, however, says only that any complaints of 
professional misconduct go to the Office of Professional Responsibility 
(ORP) within the Department of Justice, a department which handles the 
complaints through its own bureaucratic process.282  For example, in 
2009, the OPR received 1,254 complaints of misconduct from various 
sources, took a look at 245 matters, and selected 100 for a full 
investigation.283  The full investigations found that twelve government 
attorneys were responsible for violations of the rules of professional 
 
 277. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101-108 (2009). 
 278. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.102 (2009).  
 279. See 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(a)(1) (2011) (referring to both private lawyers and government 
lawyers). 
 280. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.101(b) (2009): 
(b) Persons subject to sanctions.  Persons subject to sanctions include any practitioner.  
A practitioner is any attorney as defined in §1001.1(f) of this chapter who does not 
represent the federal government, or any representative as defined in §1001.1(j) of this 
chapter.  Attorneys employed by the Department of Justice shall be subject to discipline 
pursuant to §1003.109.  Nothing in this regulation shall be construed as authorizing 
persons who do not meet the definition of practitioner to represent individuals before the 
Board and the Immigration Courts or DHS. 
Id.  See also 8 C.F.R. § 292.3(b) (2011) (creating two different disciplinary processes—one for 
respondents attorneys which is immediate and tangible as the immigration judge would hear the 
disciplinary case and one for government attorneys handled through the DOJ’s internal process). 
 281. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.109 (“Complaints regarding the conduct or behavior of Department 
attorneys, Immigration Judges, or Board Members shall be directed to the Office of Professional 
Responsibility, United States Department of Justice.  If disciplinary action is warranted, it shall be 
administered pursuant to the Department’s attorney discipline procedures.”).  For a brief discussion 
and further citation of this bifurcated disciplinary system, see 1 NAT’L IMMIGRATION PROJECT OF 
THE NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, IMMIGRATION LAW AND DEFENSE § 7:1 (3d ed. 2010). 
 282. See procedures at U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/proc-hdl.htm (last visited Mar. 10, 2012).  Presumably, the government 
attorneys are also subject to the United States Attorneys’ Manual, which consist of nine different 
titles, including criminal law, which covers immigration.  UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL 
(1997), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/eousa/foia_reading_room/usam/index.html. 
 283. See ORP ANNUAL REPORT 6 (2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opr/annualreport2009.pdf. 
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conduct, and only seven of these were found to have done so 
willfully.284      
It is under this regime of rules and sanctions that the ICE attorneys 
represent the government in deportation proceedings.  Under section 239 
of the INA, they are authorized to issue a Notice to Appear (NTA),285 
which is a charging document that outlines, among other things,286 the 
grounds of inadmissibility287 or deportability of the noncitizen.288  They 
then proceed to prove the charges by presenting evidence.289  The INA 
places the burden of proving deportability of an already-admitted 
noncitizen on the government.  It states in relevant part that the 
government “has the burden of establishing by clear and convincing 
evidence that . . . the alien is deportable.  No decision on deportability 
shall be valid unless it is based upon reasonable, substantial, and 
probative evidence.”290  To carry its burden of proof, the government 
may rely on all sorts of evidence, including the respondent’s admission 
of alienage, which is perhaps the most common source of evidence.291  
A respondent’s statement of alienage to inquiring law enforcement is 
admissible at trial, even if it is obtained in violation of the Fourth 
Amendment.292   
If the court finds the respondent deportable, he will have the 
opportunity to seek affirmative relief.293  The government’s attorney, as 
the respondent’s adversary, is tasked with the duty of making sure that 
affirmative relief is not granted by presenting evidence to counter the 
respondent’s claim.294  This issue is discussed in the next section in 
connection with the respondent’s role.  However, it is important to 
 
 284. See id. at 9. 
 285. The Regulations authorize forty-one different categories of employees of the Department 
of Homeland Security to issue NTAs.  See 8 C.F.R. § 239.1(a)(1)-(41) (2005). 
 286. Including the nature of the proceeding, the authority under which it is issued, and the act 
that is alleged to be a violation of law.  See INA § 239(a)(1)(A)-(C) (2006).  
 287. See INA § 240(a)(2) (2006).  The Grounds of inadmissibility are set forth under INA § 
212(a)(1)(A) (2010).  
 288. The grounds of deportability, incorporating grounds of inadmissibility by reference, are 
found in INA § 237 (a) (2008).  
 289. For the details of the procedure, see 8 C.F.R. § 1240.2(b). 
 290. INA § 240(c)(3)(A) (2006).  
 291. See generally INA § 240(c)(3). 
 292. See INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1040-46, 1050 (1984) (holding that the 
exclusionary rule does not apply in an immigration deportation proceeding as it is civil—not 
criminal—in character).  For a recent commentary on the exclusionary rule in immigration, see 
generally Jennifer M. Chacón, A Diversion of Attention?  Immigration Courts and the Adjudication 
of Fourth Amendment and Fifth Amendment Rights, 59 DUKE L.J. 1563 (2010).  
 293. Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1641-42. 
 294. Id.  
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emphasize here that, apart from the expectations under the rules of 
professional conduct, the government attorneys themselves, because of 
training, orientation, and tradition, see their role as more adversarial than 
in the criminal process.  For example, they are not required to produce 
exculpatory evidence,295 although a due process argument could be 
made to that effect in outrageous cases.296  
Professor Deborah Anker’s study suggests that the government 
attorneys “took an oppositional stance” in each of the 193 cases that 
researchers attended.297  For instance, in one case described in this 
study, the government’s counsel detected a substantial error of law that 
favored his client, the government, and failed to inform the court as he 
felt it was not his responsibility to make that correction in the adversarial 
process.298  In another case, defense counsel arrived late and the judge 
ruled against the non-citizen for that reason.299  When the defense 
lawyer asked for a reopening, the court said it would grant it only if the 
government agreed.300  Of course, the government’s attorney did not 
agree to reopen the case, which remained closed in favor of the 
government.301  Recall that this charade happened knowingly in the 
presence of researchers.  When asked by the researchers for a comment, 
the government’s attorney said:  “My client [the government] wants a 
deportation order.  We could not have done better.”302  Anker’s research 
further revealed that the government attorneys’ 
manner frequently was hostile, sarcastic, or disbelieving . . . [they] also 
raised repeated and vigorous objections during direct examinations.  
Although there are no formal rules of evidence in immigration 
proceedings, the trial attorneys made numerous objections to testimony 
and evidence including narrative answer, hearsay, lack of foundation, 
and leading question.  In many cases, this use of objections made it 
 
 295. See Deborah E. Anker, Determining Asylum Claims in the United States:  A Case Study 
on the Implementation of Legal Norms in an Unstructured Adjudicatory Environment, 19 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433, 489-90 (1992).  
 296. See, e.g., Diric v. INS, 400 F.2d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1968) (Ely, J., concurring) (“It 
distresses me that an alien must depart our country with justified impression that the U.S. 
Government, through an over-zealous advocate, has been unnecessarily unkind, if not abusive.”). 
 297. See Anker, supra note 295, at 436, 492.  
 298. See id. at 491. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id.  
 301. See id.  
 302. See id.  
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difficult for applicants to communicate fear and other feelings they had 
experienced . . . .303 
At the most practical level, recent studies have also found that 
practitioners believe that ICE attorneys “invariably seek the worst 
outcome possible for the immigrant and unnecessarily drag out cases by 
litigating every issue, thereby undermining both the legitimacy and 
efficiency of Immigration Courts.”304  
C. The Role of the Respondent  
Represented or not, as a party litigant in this tripartite adversarial 
process, the respondent has many responsibilities.  First, answering the 
charges of deportability, a typical NTA reads “you are removable under 
INA 237(a)(1)(A) as an alien inadmissible at the time of entry.”305  If the 
noncitizen admits this charge, knowingly or unknowingly, the judge 
would summarily find him deportable as charged.306  Unlike in criminal 
proceedings, apart from the duty to provide appropriate translation, no 
one has the responsibility to make sure that the respondent understands 
the charges, or that she admits or denies them knowingly and 
voluntarily.  The government’s responsibility is rather interesting—it is 
only to prevail, and the judge’s responsibility is only to declare the 
winner.307  It is important to reiterate that, although the respondent has 
the right to be represented by counsel, such will not be appointed or 
provided to her; she must retain and pay for legal representation,308 
which is why the vast majority of them appear without counsel.309   
Second, consistent with the adversarial tradition, the INA allows 
the respondent the opportunity to “examine the evidence against [her], to 
present evidence on [her own] behalf, and to cross-examine witnesses 
presented by the Government . . . . ”310  Third, if the charge is based on a 
lack of legal status and the respondent has a lawful status, she has the 
 
 303. Id. at 493, 495. 
 304. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-29 
(quoting CHICAGO APPLESEED FUND FOR JUSTICE, ASSEMBLY LINE INJUSTICE, BLUEPRINT TO 
REFORMING AMERICA’S IMMIGRATION COURTS 16 (2009) [hereinafter Appleseed], available at 
http://appleseednetwork.org/Portals/0/Documents/Publications/Chapter%204.pdf. 
 305. See generally INA § 237(a). 
 306. See generally 8 C.F.R. § 1240.8. 
 307. See generally INA § 240(c)(3). 
 308. See INA § 240(b)(4)(A) (“the alien shall have the privilege of being represented, at no 
expense to the Government, by counsel of the alien’s choosing who is authorized to practice in such 
proceedings.”). 
 309. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 5-8. 
 310. INA § 240(b)(4)(B).  
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burden of proving the existence of that legal status “by clear and 
convincing evidence.”311  Although it might at times be as simple as 
providing a copy of her documentation of lawful permanent resident 
status, colloquially called a ‘Green Card,’ it often demands some serious 
legal maneuvering.  Fourth, as indicated in the previous section, if the 
government prevails in obtaining the court’s ruling on the charge of 
deportability, the respondent may be allowed to seek one of the many 
forms of affirmative relief, which include asylum,312 adjustment of 
status,313 cancellation of removal,314 and voluntary departure.315  The 
respondent bears the burden of proving, not only that he meets the 
statutory requirements, but also that he deserves the favorable exercise 
of discretion, as all of these forms of relief are discretionary.316  The 
most relevant provision to this effect reads:  
The applicant must comply with the applicable requirements to submit 
information or documentation in support of the applicant’s application 
for relief or protection as provided by law or regulation or in the 
instructions for the application form.  In evaluating the testimony of 
the applicant or other witness in support of the application, the 
immigration judge will determine whether or not the testimony is 
credible, is persuasive, and refers to specific facts sufficient to 
demonstrate that the applicant has satisfied the applicant’s burden of 
proof.317 
The government’s responsibility remains to be making the contrary 
argument with a view to prevailing over the noncitizen.  The respondent 
has the right to cross-examine the government’s witnesses,318 though in 
most cases he has no idea how to do this.  The next section provides a 
detailed discussion of the judge’s role in removal proceedings.      
 
 311. See INA § 240(c)(2)(B).  
 312. See INA § 208.  A related form of relief called withholding of removal may also be sought 
as a defense from removal under INA § 241(b)(3).  The jurisprudence in this area is rich, but is 
beyond the scope of this discussion. 
 313. See INA § 245.  
 314. See INA § 240A(a)-(b).  
 315. See INA § 240B.  Other forms of affirmative relief might include Registry under INA § 
249 and Relief from Deportation under the CAT, supra note 14. 
 316. See INA §§ 208, 240A, 240B, 245(a). 
 317. INA § 240(c)(4)(B). 
 318. See INA § 240(b)(4)(B).  
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D. The Role of the Judge  
Writing in a related context, Professor Legomsky notes that judges’ 
perception of their role, which includes “their own expectations 
concerning the functions, duties, and powers that courts ought to 
assume—are one of the central factors influencing judicial decision-
making.”319  Under existing rules, the immigration judge presides over 
the dispute between the government and the respondent.320   
The role of the immigration judge has undergone significant 
changes over the years.  For much of the history of the U.S. immigration 
law, immigration judges were a part of the enforcement process, acting 
as senior immigration officers.321  Called “special inquiry officers” prior 
to 1996, their duties were not limited to adjudication of cases.322  Due 
process concerns over the merger of law enforcement and adjudicative 
functions in one official led to the Supreme Court’s 1950 decision in 
Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,323 which disallowed such merger on 
statutory grounds.324  After that decision, however, some uncertainty 
lingered because the Court’s decision, which predated the enactment of 
the INA, rested on the APA and not constitutional due process.325  In 
any case, the INA exempted the immigration processes from the 
separation of functions requirement of the APA for many practical and 
political reasons.326 
The beginning of the adversarial process could be traced to the 
enactment of the INA in 1952.  According to Professors Aleinikoff, 
Martin, and Motomura, “The seeds of this evolution were sown in the 
statute itself, which authorized the Attorney General to assign another 
immigration officer to present the evidence on behalf of the government 
 
 319. STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY:  LAW AND POLITICS IN 
BRITAIN AND AMERICA 235 (1987) (relying on numerous sources).  Although he says this in the 
judicial decision-making context, the underlying proposition probably holds true in the context of 
administrative adjudication. 
 320. See 8 C.F.R. § 1001.1(l) (“The term immigration judge means an attorney whom the 
Attorney General appoints as an administrative judge within the Executive Office of Immigration 
Review, qualified to conduct specific classes of proceedings including a hearing under section 240 
of the [Immigration and Nationality] Act.”) (emphasis in original).  Although the immigration judge 
also adjudicates cases in proceedings other than those under section 240, the focus here is on section 
240 proceedings.  The other proceedings include expedited proceedings under INA §§ 235, 238. 
 321. See THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, DAVID A. MARTIN & HIROSHI MOTOMURA, 
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP:  PROCESS AND POLICY 249 (5th ed. 2003). 
 322. Id.  
 323. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950). 
 324. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 321, at 249. 
 325. See id.  
 326. Id.  
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and to carry cross-examination.  This freed the special inquiry officer for 
a more passive, judge-like decision making role.”327  Regulatory reforms 
in 1956 and 1962 created a specialized cadre of government attorneys to 
represent the government in deportation proceedings.  “Today, in 
practice, trial attorneys appear for the government in all proceedings 
before immigration judges.”328  The roles and status of the immigration 
judges also changed during the same time.  Beginning from 1956, a law 
degree became a required qualification.329  In 1973, the name changed 
from “special inquiry officers” to “immigration judges” and the officials 
became required to wear black robes during hearings in the 
courtroom.330     
However, it was not until 1983 that the immigration judges were 
formally separated from the enforcement branch, then called the INS, to 
be organized under the EOIR within the Department of Justice.  That 
move was to ensure some independence as their previous position under 
the INS subjected them to direct supervision by the district director.331  
Although this appeared to be a move toward functional independence, 
immigration judges still remained part of the Department of Justice 
under the Attorney General, the nation’s chief law enforcement 
officer.332  The most recent restructuring occurred in 2003 as a result of 
the Homeland Security Act.333  It separated the INS, which was the 
enforcement branch, and the immigration judges into two departments, 
the Department of Homeland Security and the Department of Justice, 
respectively.334  For greater clarity, under the existing statutory and 
regulatory structure, immigration judges are within the EOIR under the 
 
 327. See id.  This evolution in the text refers to the evolution from combining enforcement and 
adjudicative functions in one person to separating them.  It is used to suggest that that was perhaps 
the beginning of the adversarial procedures as the government started to rely on a second official, 
leaving the first as a neutral decision maker, which, with the addition of the respondent as a party 
litigant, effectively converted the system into the traditional adversarial process. 
 328. Id. at 249-50. 
 329. Id. at 250. 
 330. See id. (citing Sidney B. Rawitz, From Wong Yang Sung to Black Robes, 65 Interpreter 
Releases 453 (1988)).  See also James P. Vandello, Perspectives of an Immigration Judge, 80 
DENV. U. L. REV. 770, 771 (2003) (noting the requirement to wear robes). 
 331. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 321, at 250-51.  
 332. Id. at 250.  See also Vandello, supra note 330, at 771 (noting that the concern was “judges 
being paid by the same agency that prepared and prosecuted cases.”). 
 333. See Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 6 U.S.C.). 
 334. See ALEINIKOFF ET AL., supra note 321, at 251. 
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DOJ.335  The functions of the former INS were divided into three 
agencies called the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
(USCIS),336 Customs and Border Protection (CBP),337 and Immigration 
and Customs Enforcement (ICE),338 all within the Department of 
Homeland Security.339   
Under existing rules, as indicated in the previous section, while ICE 
is responsible for representing the government, immigration judges are 
supposed to be neutral adjudicators.  This neutral role has several 
characteristics.  The pertinent statutory provision describes the general 
role as: “An immigration judge shall conduct proceedings for deciding 
the inadmissibility or deportability of an alien.”340  The statute states the 
specific functions as:  “The immigration judge shall administer oaths, 
receive evidence, and interrogate, examine, and cross-examine the alien 
and any witnesses.”341  Other powers include the issuance of subpoenas 
sanctioning of practitioners by civil money penalty for contempt of 
court.342  A related provision states: “At the conclusion of the 
proceeding the immigration judge shall decide whether an alien is 
removable from the United States.”343  More particularly, it provides 
that “The determination of the immigration judge shall be based only on 
the evidence produced at the hearing.”344   
 
 335. Comprehensive information on the structure is available at U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
EXECUTIVE OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, http://www.usdoj.gov/eoir (last visited Mar. 10, 
2012). 
 336. Comprehensive information about USCIS is available at U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND 
IMMIGRATION SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
 337. Comprehensive information about the CBP is available at U.S. CUSTOMS AND BORDER 
PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov (last visited  Mar. 10, 2012). 
 338. Comprehensive information about ICE is available at U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS 
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
 339. Comprehensive information about DHS in general is available at U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, http://www.dhs.gov (last visited Mar. 10, 2012). 
 340. INA § 240(a)(1).  
 341. INS § 240(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 342. Id.  
 343. See INA § 240(c)(1)(A).  
 344. Id.  The functions of the immigration judge are elaborated under the relevant regulations.  
See 8 C.F.R. 1240.1, which reads in its entirety:  
(a) Authority.  (1) In any removal proceeding pursuant to section 240 of the Act, the 
immigration judge shall have the authority to:  (i) Determine removability pursuant to 
section 240(a)(1) of the Act; to make decisions, including orders of removal as provided 
by section 240(c)(1)(A) of the Act; (ii) To determine applications under sections 208, 
212(a)(2)(F), 212(a)(6)(F)(ii), 212(a)(9)(B)(v), 212(d)(11), 212(d)(12), 212(g), 212(h), 
212(i), 212(k), 237(a)(1)(E)(iii), 237(a)(1)(H), 237(a)(3)(C)(ii), 240A(a) and (b), 240B, 
245, and 249 of the Act, section 202 of Pub. L. 105100, section 902 of Pub. L. 105277, 
and former section 212(c) of the Act (as it existed prior to April 1, 1997); (iii) To order 
withholding of removal pursuant to section 241(b)(3) of the Act and pursuant to the 
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As discussed above, the statute allocates the burden of proof 
between the respondent and the government,345 which means that it is 
their joint responsibility to produce the evidence.  The judge’s 
responsibility is limited to keeping the record and ruling on the record as 
developed by the parties.  In the process of the development of the 
record, however, the judge is authorized to subpoena, examine, and 
cross-examine witnesses presented by the party litigants as needed.346 
E. A Closer Look at the Roles of Three Parties:  
The above discussion shows that there is no confusion about the 
roles of the party-litigants:  they are there to win, the government to 
deport, and the noncitizen to stay, by all legal means necessary.  The role 
of the judge, however, is not without confusion.  It is characterized by 
three distinct functions:  First, the immigration judge is supposed to 
 
Convention Against Torture; and (iv) To take any other action consistent with applicable 
law and regulations as may be appropriate.  (2) In determining cases referred for further 
inquiry, immigration judges shall have the powers and authority conferred upon them by 
the Act and this chapter.  Subject to any specific limitation prescribed by the Act and this 
chapter, immigration judges shall also exercise the discretion and authority conferred 
upon the Attorney General by the Act as is appropriate and necessary for the disposition 
of such cases.  An immigration judge may certify his or her decision in any case under 
section 240 of the Act to the Board of Immigration Appeals when it involves an 
unusually complex or novel question of law or fact.  Nothing contained in this part shall 
be construed to diminish the authority conferred on immigration judges under sections 
101(b)(4) and 103 of the Act.  (b) Withdrawal and substitution of immigration judges.  
The immigration judge assigned to conduct the hearing shall at any time withdraw if he 
or she deems himself or herself disqualified.  If an immigration judge becomes 
unavailable to complete his or her duties, another immigration judge may be assigned to 
complete the case.  The new immigration judge shall familiarize himself or herself with 
the record in the case and shall state for the record that he or she has done so.  (c) 
Conduct of hearing.  The immigration judge shall receive and consider material and 
relevant evidence, rule upon objections, and otherwise regulate the course of the hearing.  
(d) Withdrawal of application for admission.  An immigration judge may allow only an 
arriving alien to withdraw an application for admission.  Once the issue of 
inadmissibility has been resolved, permission to withdraw an application for admission 
should ordinarily be granted only with the concurrence of the Service.  An immigration 
judge shall not allow an alien to withdraw an application for admission unless the alien, 
in addition to demonstrating that he or she possesses both the intent and the means to 
depart immediately from the United States, establishes that factors directly relating to the 
issue of inadmissibility indicate that the granting of the withdrawal would be in the 
interest of justice.  During the pendency of an appeal from the order of removal, 
permission to withdraw an application for admission must be obtained from the 
immigration judge or the Board.  
8 C.F.R. § 1240.1. 
 345. See, e.g., INA § 240(c)(2), (3)(A).  
 346. INA § 240(b)(1). 
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“conduct proceedings”347 presumably as a neutral adjudicator.  Second, 
she is supposed to “interrogate, examine and cross-examine”348 
witnesses, supposedly to discover the truth.  Third, she is given the 
discretion to grant or deny relief when she deems necessary.349   
While she must make her decisions based on the record as 
developed by the parties and as tested by the judge herself, ultimately 
she has no responsibility to add to the record or to independently verify 
the truth.350  Whereas her role as a cross-examiner makes her look like a 
civil law inquisitorial judge, her mandate’s restriction to the record 
produced by the parties makes her look like a traditional common law 
oriented adversarial judge.  But then, she also has this power to grant or 
deny relief in the exercise of discretion, which actually makes her look 
more like an executive official than a judicial one.  In fact, her boss is 
the nation’s chief law enforcement officer, who delegates this discretion 
to her.351  That means he could reward her if he likes her or fire her if he 
does not.352  She is supposed to be independent, but she has to be 
respectful of her law enforcement colleagues, who appear before her as 
prosecutors even though they are in a different department of the same 
agency.  When an indigent respondent appears before her who knows 
nothing about the process, she often can’t help him.  She presides over 
an average of 4.3 deportation cases a day.353  She shares her only 
assistant with four other judges.354  The majority of the respondents who 
appear before her do not speak her language.355  Her computer is old and 
her voice recorder malfunctioning, yet she is expected to render detailed, 
intelligible, and thoughtful oral decisions.  Her stress level is often 
 
 347. See INA § 240(a)(1). 
 348. See INA § 240(b)(1).  
 349. See, e.g., INA § 208 (asylum); § 240A(a)-(b) (cancellation of removal). 
 350. Id. 
 351. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (2009); see also Authorities Delegated to the Director of the 
Executive Office for Immigration Review, and the Chief Immigration Judge, 72 Fed. Reg. 53, 673 
(Sept. 20, 2007) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 1003.). 
 352. See Stephen H. Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, 91 CORNELL L. 
REV. 369, 374-75, 389 (2006).  
 353. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1652 (citing Appleseed, supra note 304, at 10). 
 354. Id.  
 355. About 78 percent of respondents have a language other than English as their first or 
primary language.  Id. at 1653. 
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higher than an emergency room physician.356  She wears so many hats.  
She has so many identities.  Is she “schizophrenic?”357   
The ordinary respondent who appears before this judge faces the 
worst of both the adversarial and inquisitorial systems because:  (1) He 
is subjected to cross examination and other forms of testing, not only by 
the opposing counsel, but also by the judge, who may appear to him to 
be “on his side.”358  (2) If he cannot present his own evidence and he 
otherwise fails to carry his burden of proof, he gets no help from the 
judge, except one or two continuations so that he can find counsel who 
could help him.  In other words, unlike the inquisitorial judge who could 
rely on judicially-discovered evidence, the immigration judge has to rely 
exclusively on evidence presented by the parties.  Unlike the common 
law judge who should maintain “cold neutrality,”359 the immigration 
judge is required to cross-examine and test the credibility of the 
respondent.360  Unlike the inquisitorial judge, she is not authorized to 
help the respondent find and/or produce evidence that could help his 
 
 356. This seems to be true.  See id. at 1655-56 (citing a web-based survey summarized in Stuart 
L. Lustig et al., Inside the Judges’ Chambers:  Narrative from the National Association of 
Immigration Judges Stress and Burnout Survey, 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 57, 59-60 (2008)). 
 357. This term is borrowed from the following paragraph by Jeffrey S. Wolfe and Lisa B. 
Proszek’s article on the role of Administrative Law Judges in the social security context, which has 
some similarities, as will be discussed in Part VI infra.  The passage reads:  
The problem, of course, is that the Commissioner is unrepresented by counsel in the 
administrative hearing.  The task of eliciting such evidence befalls the Administrative 
Law Judge, who must cull from the evidentiary record pertinent facts upon which to base 
his or her inquiry of the vocational expert, who must then opine regarding the existence 
of other work within the national or regional economies.  The inquiry is undertaken by 
the judge, subject to cross-examination by the claimant’s lawyer.  The courts have 
described this process as a sort of judicial schizophrenia, i.e., Social Security 
Administration Administrative Law Judge wears the “dual hats” of investigator and 
adjudicator. 
Jeffrey S. Wolfe & Lisa B. Proszek, Interaction Dynamics in Federal Administrative Decision 
Making:  The Role of the Inquisitorial Judge and the Adversarial Lawyer, 33 TULSA L.J. 293, 298 
(1997) (emphasis in original) (citing Pastrana v. Chater, 917 F. Supp. 103, 106-07 (D.P.R. 1996)).  
The role that is considered schizophrenic in the social security context is the coupling of 
investigative and decision making roles, which was historically the case in immigration as described 
above.  However, the existing system is more schizophrenic than the previous system because of the 
lack of clarity of the role, which is characterized by one sided investigation and decision-making 
without adversarial neutrality.  It is a combination of irreconcilable aspects of two systems.   
 358. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 295, at 489 (“Instead of an independent adjudicator and an 
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two, instead of one, 
opposing counsels.”). 
 359. See Wolfe & Proszek, supra note 357, at 300-01 (quoting United States v. Orbiz, 366 F. 
Supp. 628, 629 (D.P.R. 1973) (“A defendant is entitled to the cold neutrality of an impartial judge 
and the law intends that no judge shall preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, 
impartial and independent.”)). 
 360. Id. at 303. 
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case.361  This arrangement is a lose-lose arrangement, not only for the 
respondent, but also for the government and the judge.  It is a liability 
for the government’s counsel when the respondent is unrepresented 
because, apart from the match being uninteresting and hopelessly one-
sided, the judge cannot test the strength and propriety of the 
government’s case against the respondent.  It is a liability for the judge 
because the information she gets is one-sided and she can never be 
certain about its accuracy or completeness.  As she cannot collect her 
own evidence, she has to make a decision based on one-sided 
information.  At a more practical level, even when the respondent is 
represented and the duel is matched, what the judge gets is selected bits 
of evidence, twisted facts, and coached fact and expert witnesses.  To the 
extent this kind of adversarial process is believed to be instrumental to 
arriving at an accurate result, the most fundamental aspect of it is 
missing in the deportation context—the judge is not supposed to 
maintain “cold neutrality.”362  Considered holistically, it is clear that the 
existing system picks and chooses the worst aspects of the adversarial 
and inquisitorial systems.  The end result, not surprisingly, is a system 
that does not work well for anyone, least of all the respondent, who is 
the least-equipped of the three to navigate the process.  There is no 
disagreement as to this conclusion, although there is diversity of opinion 
concerning the diagnosis.  The next section looks at current diagnostic 
opinions and proposals for reform as a prelude to the proposals outlined 
in the section that follows.              
IV.  CURRENT DIAGNOSIS AND PROPOSALS FOR REFORM  
Increased appreciation of the failings of the system of immigration 
adjudication has in recent times created an upsurge of diagnostic 
studies363 and reform proposals by organizations,364 and prominent 
 
 361. Id. at 303-04. 
 362. See INA § 240 (b)(1).  For example, take the following passage from Professor’s Anker’s 
study:  “In general, the judges’ activism was not directed at assisting the applicant in developing the 
substance of her claim . . . the judges’ basic conception of the hearing and their role was to ‘test’—
not to help establish—the applicant’s credibility.”  See Anker, supra note 295, at 497-98.  But see 
Agyeman v. INS, 296 F.3d 871, 877 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Jacinto v. INS, 208 F.3d 725, 733-34 
(9th Cir. 2000) (holding that the IJ should “scrupulously and conscientiously probe into inquire of, 
and explore for all the relevant facts[‘]” but then adding “We emphasize that our holding today will 
not transform IJs into attorneys for aliens appearing pro se in deportation proceedings. . .”)  The 
confusion is clearly enduing.   
 363. The most notable ones are the ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, 
supra note 7; Appleseed, supra note 304; and Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25.  
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scholars.365  From this, two sets of coherent narratives have emerged—
one set relating to the diagnosis and another relating to reform.  Each set 
is briefly described below. 
A. Diagnosis 
All studies and scholarly commentary agree that the system suffers 
from inefficiency, inaccuracy, and unacceptable levels of lack of 
fairness.366  To avoid unnecessary repetition, the ABA study, which is 
the most recent and most comprehensive of all studies, may be used as a 
guide to highlighting the perceived causes of the problem.  This study 
lists several substantive and procedural factors that burden the system 
unnecessarily.  The substantive factors include the statutory bars to 
reentry367 and the breadth of the definitions of aggravated felony and 
crimes of moral turpitude.368  At the procedural level, shortcomings 
include:  large caseloads; inadequate staffing and facilities; inappropriate 
recruitment and training; bias; and lack of clarity of ethical standards 
and problems of decisional independence.369  On the prosecution side, 
shortcomings include inefficient use of prosecutorial discretion, 
inconsistent positions on issues within the department, and unnecessary 
detentions.370  Lack of representation of respondents in these 
proceedings is also identified as a major problem.371   
B. Reform Proposals 
The problem that attracted the most attention is the lack of 
decisional independence, which is perceived to be inherent in the 
 
 364. Most notably, ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 
Part 6. 
 365. Most notably, Legomsky, Restructuring Immigration Adjudication, supra note 8. 
 366. See id. at 1651; see also Chacón, supra note 292, at 1628-30; ABA REPORT ON 
REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 6-4; Appleseed, supra note 304, at 6 (all 
discussing these problems in detail). 
 367. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-65. 
 368. Id. at 1-65 to -66. 
 369. See id. at 2-16 to -27; see also Jill Family, Beyond Decisional Independence:  Uncovering 
Contributors to the Immigration Adjudication Crisis, 59 U. KAN. L. REV. 541, 541-42 (2011) 
(appreciating the problem of decisional independence but identifying related problems and 
advocating a holistic approach to solving the crisis).  
 370. See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-25 to -
59.  
 371. See id. at 5-1 to -10.  Professor Legomsky classifies the shortcoming into four categories: 
severe underfunding, reckless procedural shortcuts, inappropriate politicization of the process, and 
some unsuitable adjudicators.  See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1639. 
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structure.  As such, most reform proposals focus on that issue.372  The 
pioneer of this reform movement is Professor Legomsky.  In his 2006 
Cornell article, he argued convincingly that law enforcement supervision 
diminishes the independence of immigration adjudicators.373  He took 
that discussion a step further in his 2010 Duke article and provided a 
more complete picture of the reform that he envisions.374  A closer look 
at his proposal is very instructive. 
Professor Legomsky’s proposed reform would convert immigration 
judges into ordinary administrative law judges with all the 
accompanying benefits and protections; this would take them out of the 
DOJ and put them under a new independent executive department.375  
His proposal then merges the existing two levels of appellate review, 
i.e., the BIA and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals into a one-level 
specialized Article III court for immigration review, staffed with 
experienced district and circuit court judges on a two-year rotation 
assignment.376  He argues rather convincingly that this would be 
constitutional377 and provides the policy and cost benefits of this 
system.378  At the policy level, it maintains the specialization that is 
required of the administrative system while preserving a generalist 
review through the Article III court.379  He calls this court generalist 
because of its being staffed by rotating generalist judges.380  The 
benefits of this court system seem clear:  it merges two levels of review 
into one, simultaneously lowering judicial costs and providing due 
process by a neutral judiciary not subject to the supervision of law 
 
 372. Several studies and writings proposed an article I court to replace the existing system of 
immigration adjudication.  See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra 
note 7, at Part 6 (analyzing various options); see also Ramji-Nogales et al., supra note 25, at 386 
(endorsing the Article I option).  For an older proposal, see Peter J. Levinson, A Specialized Court 
for Immigration Hearings and Appeals, 56 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 644, 651-54 (1981).  But see 
generally Lawrence Baum, Judicial Specialization and the Adjudication of Immigration Cases, 59 
DUKE L.J. 1501 (2010) (expressing uncertainty about the outcome of a specialized court system). 
 373. See Legomsky, Deportation and the War on Independence, supra note 352, at 376-77.  
Ashcroft’s restructuring of the BIA seems to have provoked a significant part of the increased 
interest on the issue of decisional independence.  For Professor Legomsky’s earlier reaction, see 
LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 7, at 744-51.  One interesting note is the following:  “When 
the axe finally fell, it fell almost entirely on those Board members whose decisions had most 
frequently favored the noncitizens; credentials and seniority clearly played little, if any, role.”  Id. at 
750.  The earlier edition of this book also contained the same note. 
 374. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1636. 
 375. Id. at 1640.  
 376. See id. at 1686-88.  
 377. See id.  
 378. See id. at 1688-1710. 
 379. See id. at 1694-96. 
 380. See id. at. 1692. 
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enforcement officials of the executive branch.381  Professor Legomsky 
would preserve the specialization at the trial level because this 
specialization is useful and important.  He notes that one of the benefits 
of specialization is the ability of the ALJ to help the unrepresented 
respondent.382  This aspect of the proposal is quite interesting.   
This knowledge [legal knowledge and expertise] lessens their 
dependency on counsel and staff for basic information and mitigates 
the risk that a party will win or lose because of an imbalance in the 
skills or efforts of the opposing attorneys.  When parties appear pro se, 
the expertise of the adjudicator can be at least a partial substitute for 
counsel.383   
He does not, however, define the exact responsibilities of the ALJ, 
nor does he address the issue of the conduct of proceedings before the 
ALJs.  It could be assumed that he would probably maintain the existing 
adjudicatory environment while freeing the judges from political control.  
While endorsing Professor Legomsky’s macro-level restructuring 
proposal for the reasons that he presents so well, the following section 
focuses on the micro-level issues, the actual conduct of the proceedings 
before the ALJ, and that section recommends that ALJs be assigned an 
inquisitorial role, minimizing the need for representation, saving a 
significant amount of resources, and improving the fairness of the 
system.  The following proposed micro-level changes are useful in 
addressing some of the existing problems, even if the existing macro-
level structure remains unchanged.  
V.  THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE   
As Professor Taylor notes, “structural reform by itself will not 
necessarily improve the judicial demeanor of the intemperate, or make 
the slip-shod judge more careful.”384  She attributes the problem in part 
to “too many people who should not be in a position of judging others, 
especially those with no power serving as immigration judges.”385  
 
 381. See id. at 1689-1710.  Interestingly, he notes that BIA review is actually more expensive 
than court of appeals review.  See id. at 1698. 
 382. Id. at 1692-93. 
 383. Id.   
 384. See Margaret H. Taylor, Refugee Roulette in an Administrative Law Context:  The Déjà 
Vu of Decisional Disparities in Agency Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 475, 500 (2007). 
 385. Id. (quoting Charles H. Koch, Jr., Administrative Presiding Officials Today, 46 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 271, 275 (1994)). 
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Other scholars offer other explanations,386 but surprisingly, no close 
attention has been given to the benefits, drawbacks, and effects of the 
adversarial nature of the proceedings.  This section brings the 
insinuations of the discussions in the previous sections to bear by 
focusing on the comparative advantages of the inquisitorial system.   
At the risk of over-simplification, the basic considerations could be 
reduced into four basic categories:  (1) cost and efficiency, (2) accuracy, 
(3) fairness, and (4) political acceptability.  The advantages an 
inquisitorial system would bring to the trial level are discussed under 
these four categories.   
A. Cost and Efficiency 
The noncitizen’s adversaries in deportation proceedings, the 
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) of the Department of 
Homeland Security and the Office of Immigration Litigation (OIL) of 
the Department of Justice, jointly employee 951 attorneys.387  712 of 
those attorneys are ICE attorneys, and the remaining 239 are OIL 
attorneys.388  Most notably, the total number of attorneys who represent 
the government is more than quadruple the number of immigration 
judges.  All of these attorneys are tasked with the responsibility of 
making sure that the immigrants in deportation proceedings are 
deported.  As such, they almost always take a position inconsistent with 
that of the immigrant as the immigrant’s adversary.389  In this 
adversarial system, they can, and are expected to, make all non-frivolous 
arguments that might help their client, the government, win.  To use 
Judge Marvin Frankel’s words once again, they are gladiators who use 
their lethal weapons in the courtroom not to crusade after the truth, but 
to win.390  Although Judge Frankel said this in the civil litigation 
context, it is just as true, if not more so, in the context of deportation 
proceedings.  As he declares, “if this is banal, it is also overlooked too 
much . . . ”391   
 
 386. See, e.g., ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 2-25 
to -26; see also sources cited in Section II.b supra. 
 387. See Legomsky, supra note 8, at 1701, relying on data he collected through phone 
interviews and e-mail messages from DHS and DOJ contacts.  Of the total number, 712 are ICE 
attorneys.  Id. 
 388. Id.  ICE attorneys earn anywhere from $49,544 to $127,604 per year.  OIL attorneys earn 
an average of $123,000 per year.  Id. 
 389. Studies support this conclusion.  See, e.g., ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE 
IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 1-28 to -29. 
 390. Frankel, supra note 38, at 1039. 
 391. Id. 
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Imagine the amount of taxpayers’ money we would save and the 
kind of order and civility we would bring to the courtroom if we did not 
have 951 attorneys representing the same client.  It might sound 
simplistic, but consider for a moment why the United States government 
would ever need this many skillful attorneys to deport immigrants, most 
of whom are unrepresented.  If this organization under the current 
system were to be defended, if there were a simple reason why this setup 
is the ideal one, how would that defense be presented?  What might that 
simple reason be?  One thing is certain, the answer could not include 
cost-saving and efficiency, two traits no one seriously associates with 
the adversarial system.392  As to cost and efficiency, the inquisitorial 
model is clearly preferable because it would ask the 951 attorneys to 
leave the courtroom, or, if they remain in the courtroom, each would be 
the sole lawyer in the courtroom adjudicating cases, and not fighting 
tooth and nail against an unarmed adversary. 
Of course, the non-frivolous argument for the preservation of the 
adversarial system relates to the next three points:  accuracy, fairness, 
and political acceptability of the adjudicatory system.  The merits of 
these claims in the deportation context are considered in turn below.  
B. Accuracy 
If we must spend money on lawyers to ensure the accuracy of the 
outcome of immigration litigation, imagine what accuracy might result if 
we were to add 712 more judges.  This would require converting all of 
the 712 ICE attorney positions into immigration judge positions, and 
preserving the 239 OIL attorney positions for various immigration-
related prosecutorial type work that even an inquisitorial system might 
require.  The immediately apparent effect of this conversion would be 
that the existing 4.3 caseload per day per immigration judge would go 
down to about 1 a day.  Give any immigration judge one case per day, 
 
 392. For example, in an older piece, Professor David Martin suggested that affirmative asylum 
adjudication by asylum officers in a non-adversarial setting costs less than half of the adjudication 
of an asylum claim by an immigration judge in an adversarial setting.  See David A. Martin, Making 
Asylum Policy:  The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH. L. REV. 725, 746 (1995) (back then, while 
affirmative asylum cost $600, defensive asylum before an immigration judge cost $1,300).  For a 
comprehensive review of the asylum system that existed before the reform that Professor Martin 
discusses in the above cited article, and his proposal, which led to the current non-adversarial model 
of the existing affirmative asylum system, see generally David A. Martin, Reforming Asylum 
Adjudication:  On Navigating the Coast of Bohemia, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1247 (1990).   
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remove the attempts by the attorneys to “spray pepper in her eyes”393 
and measure the accuracy of the outcome.  Even to equalize the existing 
caseload of immigration judges with that of the Social Security 
Administrative Law Judges, we would need 97 more immigration 
judges.394  Note, however, that the SSA proceedings are not adversarial, 
which is why they have 1,006 judges395 on the same side, doing the 
same thing, and not confusing one another.  If we were to add 941 
lawyers to the existing pool of 214 immigration judges, we would have 
1,155 judges, significantly more than the SSA ALJs.396 
To be sure, as discussed in Section II.c above, in relation to the 
debate between Langbein and Gross, there are three fundamental 
arguments against the inquisitorial system which relate to accuracy.  The 
first of these perceived disadvantages is the possibility of a premature 
judgment by an inquisitorial judge who is also serving as an investigator.  
The response to this is that the claimant is a part of the investigation 
from start to finish and thus will be able to direct the investigating judge 
to evidence that favors him.  In the deportation context, where the 
majority of the immigrants are not represented, the alternative is 
allowing the judge to make a decision based on one-sided evidence.  A 
premature decision based on one’s own investigation is probably better 
than a decision based on incomplete evidence carefully selected and 
presented by one persuasive party.  As Langbein suggests, the benefits 
of deliberately keeping a judge ignorant are not very impressive.397  In 
any case, the effects of it depend on judicial temperament and 
experience that could perhaps be remedied through careful recruitment 
and proper training.398  A related, perceived advantage of the adversarial 
system is the educational role that counsels may play in terms of 
 
 393. For this suggestion in the context of civil trial, see FRANK, supra note 100, at 85 (“Our 
present trial method is thus the equivalent of throwing pepper in the eye of a surgeon when he is 
performing an operation.”). 
 394. According to the ABA, the caseload of each one of the approximately 214 immigration 
judge in FY 2008 was 1500 matters, including all motions and bond hearings, about 1000 requiring 
a decision.  By comparison, the caseload for each one of the 1006 SSA ALJs in 2007 was an 
average of 544 cases.  According to the study, to match that number, we would need 97 more 
immigration judges.  See ABA REPORT ON REFORMING THE IMMIGRATION SYSTEM, supra note 7, at 
2-37.  
 395. See id. at 2-37. 
 396. Converting ICE trial attorneys into ALJs for immigration could raise issues of 
prosecutorial bias; however, the bias is often functional, not inherent.  A change in role ordinarily 
changes the bias.  To the extent that bias is a concern, however, some balance might be sought in 
the hiring, training, and retention process. 
 397. See Langbein, supra note 31, at 830. 
 398. See id. at 848-51.  
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bringing cases and authority to the attention of the court.  Apart from 
that being counterbalanced by the inevitable deliberate selectiveness 
which could lead to misinformation, whatever benefit there is, it is even 
less in the immigration context as immigration judges are specialists in 
the area and that most cases involve factual rather than legal disputes.         
The second, and perhaps more important, argument relates to 
individual autonomy.  As Langbein notes, the celebration of the 
adversarial system comes from the criminal justice system.  This system 
has some very basic principles, such as the presumption of innocence, 
the privilege against self-incrimination, and requiring proof of guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt.399  The adversarial system in the criminal 
context protects the accused person’s right to gather his own evidence 
and present it in a way he wishes.400  If that responsibility were given 
over to a judicial officer, the defendant would lose his autonomy.  This 
loss of autonomy is not necessarily linked to accuracy, but the argument 
is that the truth emerges in the courtroom through selective presentation 
of the evidence.401  Whatever merits this may have in the context of the 
criminal justice system—which is doubtful as the criminal justice system 
also has its own problems—it does not necessarily hold true in the 
immigration context.  First, there is no presumption of “innocence” as 
such in the immigration context and the standards of proof are different.  
In the removal process, the government has the burden of proving 
alienage by clear and convincing evidence.402  What would the 
noncitizen lose if a judicial officer, who does not have to win a case, 
investigates the claim of alienage?  Particularly, if the noncitizen is 
without counsel, he would have everything to gain if the only official is 
a person who is interested in finding out the truth, not deporting him as a 
matter of duty.   
Once alienage is established, the noncitizen bears the burden of 
proving that he is in the country lawfully.403  There are a limited number 
of documents in the government’s possession that could help him prove 
that.404  The noncitizen loses absolutely nothing if the judge were to 
investigate the government’s records to find out what status the 
noncitizen has.  If he is found to have a status of lawful presence, the 
 
 399. Id. at 842 & n.68 (citing Garner v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655 (1976) (noting that 
“the preservation of an adversary system of criminal justice” is “the fundamental purpose of the 
Fifth Amendment.”)). 
 400. See id. at 842. 
 401. See id. at 842-43. 
 402. INA § 240 (c)(3)(A). 
 403. Id. § 240 (c)(2)(B). 
 404. Id. 
66
Akron Law Review, Vol. 45 [2012], Iss. 3, Art. 5
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol45/iss3/5
11- KIDANE_MACRO.DOCM 7/16/2012  11:04 AM 
2012] THE INQUISITORIAL ADVANTAGE 713 
government bears the burden of proving that he is deportable—again by 
clear and convincing evidence.405  This evidence is almost always found 
in the possession of government bodies, whether state or federal.  The 
issue of deportability often revolves around whether certain facts, such 
as convictions, fit the statutory grounds of deportation.  In a situation 
where both the government and the noncitizen are represented, 
interesting arguments could be heard.  Even then, though, there is no 
guarantee that the judge gets candid presentation.  She has to make her 
judgment based on unabashedly partisan presentation.  If she were to be 
the investigator with sufficient resources, she could make her own 
decisions without confusion.   
If the noncitizen is unrepresented, which is more likely than not the 
case, it is a totally different story.  The judge then makes her decision 
based on a completely one-sided presentation.  If the noncitizen is found 
deportable, the onus shifts to him to prove his eligibility for a form of 
affirmative relief.  In this context, the judge has full discretion to grant it 
or not.  Allowing her to investigate the facts and the law would only 
facilitate her decision-making.  If the noncitizen is unrepresented, 
however, there is no meaningful presentation of evidence.  The judge 
can only rely on the government’s presentation, which is always 
negative toward the noncitizen, as it is the function of the adversarial 
system.  Obviously, in that situation, the noncitizen would be well 
served if the judge were empowered to do the investigation of the 
evidence.  Recall the response by the immigration judge at the beginning 
of this article, which laconically sums up the adversarial system in the 
situation presented by the student.  An inquisitorial judge would make 
sure that the non-citizen’s forms are completed properly, would 
investigate the facts on her own and would rule as she deems 
appropriate.  If she passively waits for submissions before declaring a 
winner, her decisions are necessarily inaccurate every time there is an 
imbalance in representation.  This is more likely than not in most 
immigration cases.   
The third issue is the potential for bureaucratic abuse when the duty 
of investigation is merged with that of decision-making.  It is an old 
dilemma in the administrative law arena, which has been tolerated by the 
Supreme Court.406  It is undeniable that the career judiciary could be a 
large bureaucracy prone to misuse of power, but in the context of 
 
 405. Id. 
 406. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) (“Neither are we persuaded by the 
advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion . . . [The Administrative Law Judge] . . . does not act as 
counsel.  He acts as an examiner charged with developing facts.”). 
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deportation, the alternative is many times worse.  It typically involves on 
one side a governmental interest represented by vigorous counsel 
seeking to make sure that the non-citizen is deported at all costs, an 
unrepresented non-citizen who does not understand the chaotic swirling 
of events around him, and a judge who needs to make a decision based 
on an intentionally incomplete record developed through the parties’ 
adversarial exchange.  How accurate could that be?  How often does that 
system get the decision right?    
C. Fairness 
The complexity of the immigration law does not need repeating.  
We also know that the overwhelming majority of non-citizens in 
deportation proceedings are not represented by counsel.  The best they 
could expect to get in the way of assistance is forms, checklists, and 
templates, which some courts reject for not meeting formal 
requirements.407  The government, on the other hand, is always 
represented by attorneys who have the advantage of being repeat players 
and who have access to government data that the noncitizen does not 
have.  If the noncitizen wants to see the records, he would have to file a 
FOIA request, which takes an inordinate amount of time.  When the 
government’s attorney appears in the courtroom, it is often in a suit and 
tie or some other formal attire.  When the noncitizen appears, it is often 
in a neon orange jumpsuit.  Instead of a tie, some wear shackles.408  
While the court makes no mention of the low dress code of the 
noncitizen, his decorum triggers a prejudgment response in the judge’s 
mind, instantly making the noncitizen fight up an even steeper hill.  
The fairness argument relates to the fact that the adversarial system 
provides both parties the opportunity to be heard.  To use Langbein’s 
words, it presumes Waffenungleichheit, or the inequality of weapons.409  
If the weapons are not matched, there is no denying that there is no fair 
duel.  So, in the majority of the cases in deportation proceedings where 
the government is well-represented and the noncitizen unrepresented, it 
is fair to assume that the adversarial system yields unfair results as a 
matter of common sense.  When the noncitizen is represented, it might 
seem like the system could be fair.  But even then, it is not.  Going back 
to Professor Anker’s study, because of the judge’s responsibility under 
 
 407. See, e.g., Appleseed, supra note 304, at 30-31. 
 408. I have had clients who appeared before immigration judges in shackles because of alleged 
disciplinary violations in the detention facility. 
 409. See Langbein, supra note 31, at 843.  
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the statute to test the credibility of the respondent, but not to help him, it 
almost always appears that the respondent faces two well-trained 
government attorneys against him.  The judge examines and cross-
examines witnesses as a matter of statutory obligation.  Often, the only 
witness in these proceedings is the noncitizen.  Refusing to testify is not 
an option because that usually means no case at all for the immigrant.  
The judge’s position is awkward:  it is actively investigative when 
testing the credibility of the respondent if he presents evidence, whether 
through an attorney or otherwise, but passively neutral if no evidence is 
presented by the respondent.  So, Anker’s conclusion that the respondent 
faces two government attorneys under the existing system seems 
accurate.410   
However, under the investigative model, the judge would treat both 
parties equally and attempt to find both inculpatory as well as 
exculpatory evidence and would then decide the case based on her own 
investigation through the help of the parties.  In this instance, the system 
would be fair for both parties, as there would not be a representational 
advantage.  Instead of the appearance of facing two governmental 
attorneys, the noncitizen would face only one, who would be tasked with 
the duty of finding the truth and applying the law impartially.  It is 
reasonable to expect that most would do so fairly and appropriately.411  
For exactly this reason, despite many complaints, it appears that the 
affirmative asylum system is fairer than the adversarial immigration 
court system.412    
 
 410. See, e.g., Anker, supra note 295, at 489 (“Instead of an independent adjudicator and an 
opposing counsel, the perception arose in many cases that applicants faced two, instead of one, 
opposing counsels.”).  
 411. As Professor Legomsky noted in an e-mail to this author, in such a system, the decisional 
independence of the Judges would be even more important than in the existing system.  Indeed, that 
is an issue that needs to be properly addressed at the macro level.   
 412. See, e.g., Taylor, supra note 384, at 500 (citing Gregg A. Beyer, Affirmative Asylum 
Adjudication in the United States, 6 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 253 (1992)); Gregg A. Beyer, Establishing 
the United States Asylum Officer Corps:  A First Report, 4 I NT’L J. REFUGEE L. 455 (1992); Gregg 
A. Beyer, Reforming Affirmative Asylum Processing in the United States:  Challenges and 
Opportunities. 9 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 9, 43-78 (1994); David A. Martin, Making Asylum Policy:  
The 1994 Reforms, 70 WASH.  L. REV. 725 (1995); see also Ming H. Chen, Explaining Disparities 
in Asylum Claims, 12 GEO. PUB. POL’Y REV. 29 (2007) (suggesting, based on social science data, 
that the non-adversarial affirmative asylum system has significant benefits).  In her own words:  
It is important to highlight social scientific concepts in the framing of the problem and 
the formulation of explanatory hypotheses so that social science can also inform policy 
reforms.  Notably, this study of asylum adjudication reveals that social science intuitions 
and explanations differ from the shared wisdom of lawyers.  Immigration attorneys 
implicitly assume that their clients will benefit from increased formalism and legalism.  
As a result, they struggle mightily to obtain increased substantive rights and enhanced 
procedural protections for asylum applicants.  However, social science challenges that 
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D. Political Acceptability 
Presumably a fair, efficient, and less costly system would have 
better political acceptability.  The inquisitorial system is cheaper, as it 
gets rid of the needless adversity and the resulting complexity.  If 712 
ICE attorneys are taken outside of the courtroom, not only would that 
free up a lot of space and time, but they could also be used for a more 
productive and useful activity, such as serving as immigration judges.  
This might seem a strange proposal, given that merging investigative 
and decision-making authorities into one person is considered harmful to 
the vulnerable party.413  That might be true if the weapons in the duel 
are matched.  But the reality in deportation proceedings is that the 
adversarial system costs the government more money, causes more 
suffering to the noncitizen, and brings serious confusion to the judge.  
The end result is a needlessly complicated, less forgiving, and more 
expensive adjudicatory system.  Such a system is less politically 
acceptable than the alternative, at which nobody seems to be currently 
looking—a system whereby the judge investigates the facts and decides 
the case—a system where errors could be corrected through appeals, 
which could take many different forms, including Professor Legomsky’s 
Article III Court proposal.        
VI.  CONCLUSION  
When Stefan Riesenfeld, who later became a distinguished 
international scholar, arrived in America in January 1935, the renowned 
legal realist Karl Llewellyn reportedly told him:  if you want to give 
your idea a “kiss of death,” say that it has originated in a foreign 
country.414  But, to quote a foreign jurist in this domestic proposal, 
“Why don’t [we] take advantage of what has been done by the civil law, 
that governs at least twice as many people as the common law, is two 
thousand years older, and embodies a much greater amount of human 
 
assumption.  Under certain circumstances, the more informal and less adversarial climate 
of asylum interviews benefits asylum applicants, whereas the adversarial character of 
Immigration Court acts to their detriment.  
Id. at 44-45. 
 413. See generally Milton M. Carrow, A Tortuous Road to Bureaucratic Fairness:  Righting 
the Social Security Disability Claims Process, 46 ADMIN. L. REV. 297 (1994) (arguing that the 
merging of these two functions in one person in the context of the social security system is a bad 
idea.  He certainly has not considered the problems with that system which this article did in some 
detail). 
 414. Stiefel & Maxeiner, supra note 31, at 162 (citing Riesenfeld, Statement at the Association 
of American Law Schools Annual Meeting (1987)). 
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experience?”415  In fact, introducing the inquisitorial model is not such a 
revolutionary idea.  The affirmative asylum system is one example, and 
many administrative agencies already use the system with varying 
degrees of success.416   
This article does not recommend any specific inquisitorial model, 
but it looks at the problem presented by the adversarial system from 
inside the courtroom and tries to call attention to a neglected factor in 
the debate.  The debate is decidedly at the macro level, focusing mainly 
on administrative and judicial structure and decisional independence.  
The question is almost never asked how well the adversarial system at 
the micro level is serving immigration adjudication.  This article raises 
that question and finds that the answer is not promising.  What sustains 
the adversarial system is the unwarranted association between civil 
liberties and the adversarial system,417 and the unsupported conclusion 
that it leads to a more accurate, politically acceptable, and fair result.  
Whatever its merits in the criminal justice system, it does not hold true 
in the immigration system.    
This article has attempted to show that the adversarial system in the 
deportation context does not work well for anyone—not for the 
prosecutor, not for the judge, and most of all not for the respondent.  It is 
a political and cultural imaginary with no real benefits, but with 
significant drawbacks.  Put simply, it is a due process issue.  As the 
Supreme Court has noted, “considerations of what procedures due 
process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin 
with a determination of the precise nature of the government function 
involved as well as of the private interest that has been affected by 
governmental action.”418  What works in one context may not work in 
another.  In a situation where only one party is represented, a claim of 
adversarial fairness or ‘cold neutrality’ of the adjudicator is a mockery 
of justice.  The call for the provision of representation to indigent 
respondents in deportation proceedings has so far yielded no result, and 
a favorable result is unlikely any time soon.  If one of the parties in an 
adversarial proceeding is unrepresented, elementary notions of fairness 
 
 415. Id. at 147 n.1.  This statement is attributed to French Jurist Pierre LePaulle. 
 416. The Social Security Administration is another example.  For a brief comparison between 
the asylum adjudication process and the social security adjudication process, see Taylor, supra note 
384, at 485-95.  The standard citation on the fundamentals of the Social Security Adjudication cited 
in id. is JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE:  MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY 
CLAIMS (1983).     
 417. Kessler, supra note 31, at 1273.  
 418. Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); see 
also Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 261-63 (1970).  
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require that the other be not represented as well.  That leaves two people 
in the courtroom:  the respondent and the judge.  Perhaps, in such 
situation, the judge should investigate the case and make a decision on 
her own.  That is much better than the alternative, which has been 
tolerated for far too long.  Needless to say, we know that such an 
inquisitorial model in the administrative arena is perfectly 
constitutional.419  Until we are able to match the weapons in the duel, 
maybe we ought to think about settling the dispute differently. 
 
 419. See, e.g., Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 403 (1971). 
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